Defaults Including Charges And Interest Settled, Rbs And Equifax Refusing To Remove Info

[Hadituptohere]

Notice of Issue received, issued on the 23rd December deemed served 28th December, RBS have till 12th Jan to reply......

 

:cool:

Hadituptohere

[Hadituptohere]

Received today......

 

 

 

 

ALONG with another copy of this crap....

 

 

 

looks like its game on...

 

Hadituptohere

[car2403]

One thing to note is that the complaints team probably don't know you've issued a Court claim against them.

 

Roll on 26th January...

[Hadituptohere]

it will be interesting to see their defence, they have admited they cant come up with any legal documents regarding the defaults....

I forgot to mention in my claim I had reduced the amount to 500.00 per default seeing as the main reason for serving was to get the defaults removed.

 

Hadituptohere

Edited January 3, 2009 by Hadituptohere

[Josie8]

Good luck

[Hadituptohere]

Thanks josie x

[Hadituptohere]

Well received in the post this afternoon....

 

Not bad hey?????? deadline 11.00am 22nd Jan, received 12.20pm 22nd Jan.

 

 

Also message on answer machine for me to contact Mrs **** regarding a personal matter, which I did and its a solicitor acting on behalf of RBS requesting an extention for their defence as RBS are having difficulty retrevieing their corresponding paperwork from storage facillities. Which I didnt agree to as RBS have strung this out already, she informed me that she was going to request this before the district judge. Have I done the right thing????

 

Hadituptohere

[car2403]

They wouldn't offer to settle if they thought they had a chance of winning.

 

You need to decide how much £750, including leaving the CRA data on your file, is worth to you.

 

To answer your question, you have done the right thing - the Court is unlikely to grant any extra time for their defence on that basis, as the timeframe for entering a Defence is clearly stated in Civil Procedure rules.

 

When is there Defence due in, exactly?

[Hadituptohere]

Hi car

 

The 750.00 is neither here or there, its the defaults doing the damage, as from april my credit file would be clear if it wasnt for the RBS defaults.

 

As far as I could tell the solicitor said they have to have their defence in by tomorrow hence asking for the extention but I thought it was the 26th they had until

 

the letter they sent today also states that they will use it in court as evidence against me if I refuse to accept the offer.

 

Hadituptohere

Edited January 22, 2009 by Hadituptohere

[car2403]

the letter they sent today also states that they will use it in court as evidence against me if I refuse to accept the offer.

 

They can only use it should you go on and lose on less favourable terms - even then the Judge will decide whether to order costs against you as a result of refusing it, which will be unlikely should it be a small claim.

[Hadituptohere]

on a technicality i haven't even had time to accept the offer, due to either post-dating or super slow post 7 days delivery?? smells a little fishy to me

[Hadituptohere]

Been in touch with the court today and they have applied for an extension for their defense. The court could only tell me I would receive something in post from the court this week?????

 

Hadituptohere

[Hadituptohere]

 

In todays post.

 

 

If Car is right why have they allowed this when RBS knew about my complaint back in August last year?

 

Hadituptohere

[cadencealex]

Natwest (same as RBOS)

 

Wrote me a lengthy letter saying that they took breach of Data Protection seriously and removed my Default within a fortnight!

 

It was a satisfied Default!

 

I found their service so good I am half tempted to write a thank you note!

[Hadituptohere]

Thats a result and a half, good news. Any chance of seeing their reply less the personal details??

 

I wish RBS would do the same but instaed they prefer to go down this route

 

Hadituptohere

[cadencealex]

Thats a result and a half, good news. Any chance of seeing their reply less the personal details??

 

I wish RBS would do the same but instaed they prefer to go down this route

 

Hadituptohere

 

 

I posted it up.. if you find my threads it is the Natwest default removal thread

 

I got a nice letter apologising for problems with customer services..

 

I quoted from the letter on the thread.

 

If you wish I can scan the whole thing up for you but it will take me a while as i packed the printer away for now (Done all my letters and I used a laptop)

[Hadituptohere]

its fine thanks will look up your thread might come in handy

 

 

Hadituptohere

[cadencealex]

its fine thanks will look up your thread might come in handy

 

 

Hadituptohere

 

 

Yours is the exact same situation as mine and Natwest jumped through hoops with a few smart phone calls and two letters

 

Excellent service when I got past the call centre monkeys who spoke to me like I was responsible for thousands of pounds of non payments.. mine was a modest default, settled instantly!!!

[Hadituptohere]

Time running out for RBS defence......

[Hadituptohere]

HeHeHe been in touch with the court today (15.45) and theres NO defence from RBS (they even checked to see if it was on someones desk)

 

Thats after their 4 weeks extention.

 

Been told to contact the court Monday morning just in case they manage to get it there by 16.00.

 

Hadituptohere

[Hadituptohere]

Well spoke to soon recieved an 11 page defence today in the post, looks like a righ load of bumf, goes on about charges a hell of a lot and the legalities of the charges, theres a blank CCA and diary entries for default notices sent out but no default notices and it looks like someones been doing some handy work with the terms and conditions and applying a hand written date to them.

will post them once scanned

 

Hadituptohere

[Hadituptohere]

Hi guys this is going to be one lengthy post... After re reading the defence it looks like they are tryiing to base the defence on the legalities of the charges on the account and defending the repayment of these charges... NOT the failure to comply with the Subject Access Request under the Data Protection Act, and the failure to act to my s10/12 Notice and they certainly havent supplied a document to support any permision given to pass on my details to third parties.

 

Would love for someone more in the know regarding this little lot to have a read and give me some thoughts to this matter.

 

Here goes....

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[car2403]

I would need to go back through the thread to see the POC and how this defence responds to it, (it may be worth posting links to those POC making that easier, HIUTH) but from what I can see, while it's fair to say they may be able to rely on the OFT TC outcome, they should really be seeking a stay of proceedings until the appeals are all resolved, rather than defending the claim on this basis. (Penalty charges not being unlawful penalties) It's also fair to say that they can only partially defend the claim on that basis - the part that covers the charges.

 

So, what %-age of the debt do the charges represent? I'm assuming your POC raises the issue of enforceability of the entire agreement? This defence doesn't deal with any of those issues, from what I can see.

 

Lastly, they are being very naughty asking for a strikeout under CPR Part 3.4 (no reasonable prospect of success) and/or Judgment under CPR Part 24.2, (Summary Judgment) in their Defence statement. They should be well aware that a proper application under 3.4/24.2 should come on a formal Application Notice and also attracts a fee making such an Application.

 

Before you go any further, I'd suggest that you;

a) contact the Court to ask if the Court will accept this Application in the format that the Defendant has entered it in;

b) ask the Court if they have received payment of the fee associated for that Application, should it accept the Application in the format that it is in;

c) ask the Court to issue an order, confirming all these details, and issuing directions for the future conduct of the claim to both parties, based on what they have received so far;

d) be prepared to receive an Allocation Questionnaire, but also be prepared to say you can't complete that part of the Courts directions until these details are confirmed and a supporting Court Order with updated directions have been issued.

e) come back to the thread once you have all that.

f) when you have all this, you may want to consider asking for the Court to strike out the Defence statement on the 3.4/24.2 grounds yourself, for the same reasons, in that the statement doesn't meet the demands of the POC, so has no realistic prospect of success itself and meaning you should receive Summary Judgment in your favour - not Summary Judgment in the Banks favour.

 

The reason you can't comply with an AQ direction, is that the AQ will presume that the final determination hearing is being planned after the Allocation takes place - if the Court accepts the defence as an Application under 3.4/24.2, that isn't appropriate, as an Application Hearing (not a final determination hearing) will be required. You will prepare differently for an Application Hearing compared to how you'd prepare for a final determination hearing.

 

It's a very poor show that they haven't complied with CPR and proper procedure, but they may simply be stalling the final outcome hoping to scare you off by trying to flex their Corporate muscle. I suspect, in either case, no matter what happens, all this needs to be brought to the Judges attention (Application hearing or final hearing) and used to your advantage to show that the Bank hasn't played nicely - it could also be useful at the later stages, should you go on and win, when the Court considers the issue of costs.

[Hadituptohere]

Sorry again lenthy to repeat but here are my POC's, also I have a claim for charges of around 1800.00 against RBS but this case has been stayed pending the outcome of the OFT case.

 

 

1. I, the Claimant in this case, am a litigant in person and I make this particulars of claim statement from my own knowledge and experience.

 

2. Since August 1998 xxxxx xxxxxxx (the claimant) banked with The Royal Bank of Scotland (the defendant).

 

3. On the xxth August 2002 the claimant took out a Personal Loan No: xxxxxxxx from the defendant to the value of £xxxxx.00

 

4. On xxth July 2006 the defendant applied for a County Court Judgment to the value of £xxxxxx against the claimant regarding the above Loan and Over draught in the Northampton County Court case number xxxxxxxx.

 

5. Not being familiar with legal procedure in England and lack of legal knowledge, on xxst July 2006 the Claimant paid the value of the Judgement and on the xth August 2006 and received a Certificate of Satisfaction or Cancellation of Judgement Debt.

 

6. The Claimant, having conducted an audit of his Credit Reference Files held with 3 Credit References Agencies, discovered that the Defendant had recorded 2 “Default’s” against the Claimant in relation to these accounts, one on xx March 2004, with an original default balance of £xxx.00. The latest update to this entry is dated xx October 2006, showing an Settled balance, and the second on xx March 2004, with an original default balance of £xxxx.00 The latest update to this entry is dated xx August 2006, showing an Settled balance

 

THE DATA PROTECTION ACT 1998

 

7. On xxth September 2008, a Subject Access Request was made by the Claimant under s.7 of the Data Protection Act 1998, to obtain all information regarding the bank account and loan’s between the defendant and the claimant which would have included copies of the originally executed credit agreements that the alleged debt refers to. In addition, statements of the account should have been provided, along with any other document referenced in the credit agreement and a request to substantiate the default information recorded. The request was sent via Royal Mail with recorded delivery, enclosing a statutory fee of £10.00. Royal Mail confirms receipt of this request on xxth September 2008, which gave the Claimant forty days from receipt of the request, to provide said documentation, the deadline to comply with the request was xx October 2008.

 

8. In a reply dated xxth October 2007, the Defendant provided their reply to the claimants Subject Access Request under The Data Protection Act 1998.

 

9. The Defendant has failed to supply important legal documentation as required by s.7, 8 and 9 of The Data Protection Act 1998 namely;

a) Valid fully executed Consumer Credit Agreement,

b) Default notice, Termination Notice required under the Consumer Credit Act 1974,

c) Legal documentation for the court action taken against the claimant,

therefore the Defendant has breached the Data Protection Act 1998 and is in default of this request.

 

10. Due to the breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 the Claimants pleadings regarding the defaulting and termination of the account, outlined in paragraph 16-21 of this statement, specifically;

i. That the account has been improperly and unlawfully defaulted and terminated; (s.88/s.98 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the Consumer Credit (Enforcement, Default and Termination Notices) Regulations 1993)

ii. This improper default and termination has effected (and continues to effect) the Claimants reputation and credit rating held by credit reference agencies;

iii. The Defendants failure to reply to, or to unconditionally comply with, a Statutory Notice issued by the Defendant pursuant to s.10 and s.12 of the Data Protection Act 1998, requiring it to remove this information from its own records and to cease from continuing to process or share that information.

 

11. The Claimant disputes the balance of the account, as outlined in paragraph 16 of this statement;

 

12. The Defendant disputes the balance of the account, as during the period in which the account was operating the Defendant debited charges to the account in respect of purported breaches of contract on the part of the Claimant and also charged interest on the charges once applied. The Claimant understands that the Defendant will contend that the charges were debited in accordance with the terms of the contract between itself and the Claimant and accordingly puts the Defendant to strict proof of such terms existence. The Claimant contends:

a) No such contractual provision exists to allow the Defendant to levy such charges;

b) Where there is a contractual provision that permits the Defendant to levy such charges, this provision is unenforceable by virtue of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (1999) and the Common Law of penalty because they are a disproportionately high sum in compensation compared to the cost of the purported breach; are not a genuine pre-estimate of cost incurred by the Defendant; exceed any alleged actual loss to the Defendant in respect of any breaches of contract on the part of the Claimant; and are not intended to represent or are related to any alleged actual loss, but instead unduly enrich the Defendant, which exercises the contractual term in respect of such charges with a view to profit; and

c) Accordingly the Claimant puts the Defendant to strict proof that every charge made to the account was valid and lawful.

d) The Claimant avers that any Default or Termination Notice sent would have included these charges, invalidating that Notice due to this unlawful application.

 

13. The Defendant has failed to fully comply with the Claimant’s request for information to substantiate the process taken to Default the agreement.

 

14. Accordingly, the Claimant puts the Defendant to strict proof that the agreement has been defaulted and terminated in accordance with s.88/s.98 CCA 1974 and the Consumer Credit (Enforcement, Default and Termination Notices) Regulations 1993.

 

15. Where the Defendant is unable to supply original signed certified copies of alleged Default Notices or Termination Notices, the Claimant pleads that the agreement has been unlawfully defaulted and terminated, in that, either;

a) No Default Notice or Termination Notice has been issued; or

b) Where the Defendant can show evidence that Default or Termination Notices were issued, such Notices are not accurate and fail to comply with s.88/s.98 CCA 1974 and the Consumer Credit (Enforcement, Default and Termination Notices) Regulations 1993, in that the Default and Termination amounts are incorrect as per paragraph 13 of this statement.

 

16. The Claimant refers to specific paragraphs of the House of Lords case Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2003] UKHL 40;

 

Para 49;

"The message to be gleaned from sections 65, 106, 113 and 127 of the Consumer Credit Act is that where a court dismisses an application for an enforcement order under section 65 the lender is intended by Parliament to be left without recourse against the borrower in respect of the loan"

 

Para 121;

"But the effect of the failure to comply with the requirements of the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 was that the entire agreement under which FCT provided the loan to Mrs Wilson............... was unenforceable. The statutory bar on its enforcement extended to FCT's right to recover the total sum payable on redemption, which included the principal as well as interest."

 

Para 123;

"section 127(3) of the 1974 Act too, like sections 6 and 13(1) of the 1927 Act, was designed to protect unsophisticated borrowers. There is no doubt that they would be exposed to the risk of harassment by unscrupulous creditors if creditors could override the statute by appealing to the common law. I would prefer to say that it would be inconsistent with the statute to provide FCT with a common law remedy to redress the enrichment which Mrs Wilson has received at its expense"

 

Para 173;

"Parliament's intention in enacting section 127(3) of the 1974 Act was to make a loan, made under a regulated agreement, unenforceable in certain events. The courts cannot defeat that intention by allowing some alternative means of recovery."

 

17. The Claimant contends that the Wilson case ruling is intended to have the effect that creditors who do not have enforceable consumer credit agreements are not to be allowed to intimidate, harass and effectively blackmail debtors into paying monies that they do not have to pay by, for example, threatening to blacklist the credit records of debtors. The financial penalty for a lender not complying with the legislation is that they lose the right to any monies not already paid. The law lords considered the issue of unjust enrichment but decided that it was appropriate for the creditor to be financially penalised in this way.

 

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DEFAULT AND TERMINATE AGREEMENT CORRECTLY;

 

18. Failure of a Default or Termination Notice to be accurate not only invalidates the Default or Termination Notice (Woodchester Lease Management Services Ltd v Swain & Co - [1998] All ER (D) 339) but is an unlawful rescission of contract which would not only prevent the Court enforcing any alleged debt, but give the Claimant a claim for damages. (Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All ER 119)

 

 

19. The Claimant contests that the Defendants continued processing of his data is an unwarranted act and that the Defendant has failed to comply with a Statutory Notice pursuant to s.10 and s.12 of the Data Protection Act 1998. (Herein referred to as Data Protection Act 1998

 

20. The Claimants written permission allowing the Defendant to continue processing, or disclosing, personal subject data, does not exist. The Claimant also disputes the Defendants “Defaulting” of the accounts, which is visible on his Credit Reference files, for the reasons outlined above. The Claimant, therefore, considers any Default appearing on any Credit Reference Files in relation to this alleged agreement to be wholly unwarranted and unlawful.

 

21. The Claimant is afforded principled rights under the Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 1, Part 1 ("The Principles") in relation to the manner in which data is collated, stored and processed. Of particular note, are Principles 3, 4 and 5:

“3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed.

4. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.

5. Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.”

 

22. In this case, the Defendant is processing data without consent. Consent in this case meaning the lawful right to process data, with permission, with the Credit Reference Agencies – that information being “publicly available”.

 

23. The claimant asserts therefore that any Default/Termination Notice amounts to a material breach of the fourth Principle of The Data Protection Act 1998.

 

24. The Claimant, therefore, commences proceedings against the Defendant under the Data Protection Act 1998 for the removal of any Default/Termination Notice, or any information relating to the agreement that will, or may, cause prejudice to the Claimant.

 

25. This is confirmed in Principle 2 of the Data Protection Act, which states:

 

"2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes."

 

26. The Claimant wishes to emphasise the term "specified and lawful purposes" as in ‘those specified within the contract’, and no more, and also emphasises the term "shall not be further processed".

 

 

27. After seeing other cases being handled, the Claimant is aware that Financial Institutions are claiming that they have a “legal right” to maintain this type of adverse entry for up to six years. When challenged, they are unable to quote the exact Statute that includes this so-called “legal right” - they in fact remain remarkably quiet when questioned about this. Only after insistence of disclosure do they eventually concede that, whilst they have no statutory right, it is “standard industry practice” but they added that they are “allowed to by Law”. After further challenges, they finally admit that unless this was a County Court issue, their term actually referred to contractual Law, but continued to emphasise that it was “standard industry practice to record default entries for six years.” In this case, no such contractual provision exists, so reliance on any contract should fail under the Data Protection Act 1998.

 

28. After scrutiny of all the relevant legislation, including the Consumer Credit Act (as amended), the various Financial Services Acts and the Data Protection Act, etc., it is clear that there is absolutely no legislation that allows a lender or supplier (e.g. the Defendant) to collate, process or distribute any other information unless there is express written permission from the data subject.

 

29. In fact, Section 10 of the Data Protection Act awards the real authority, regarding privacy of data, to the data subject, not the Data Controller. The Act is also very clear as to the rights of the data subject in respect of withdrawing permission to continue data processing and disclosure:

 

“10. - (1) Subject to subsection (2), an individual is entitled at any time by notice in writing to a data controller to require the data controller at the end of such period as is reasonable in the circumstances to cease, or not to begin, processing, or processing for a specified purpose or in a specified manner, any personal data in respect of which he is the data subject, on the ground that, for specified reasons-

(a) the processing of those data or their processing for that purpose or in that manner is causing or is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to him or to another, and

(b) that damage or distress is or would be unwarranted.”

 

30. However, there is some exclusion provisions for Data Controllers, and Section 10 does continue with various exceptions to subsection (1) above, and these are quoted, in full, below:

 

“10. - (2) Subsection (1) does not apply-

(a)in a case where any of the conditions in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Schedule 2 is met, or;

(b)in such other cases as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State by order.”

 

To paragraph (b), I can only presume that the Defendant has not applied to HM Secretary of State for an order allowing you an exclusion, which leaves the Defendant with the only remaining possibility of requesting an exemption under paragraph (a).

 

So, we must turn to the exemptions permitted in paragraph (a) to find where the Defendants Data Controller may invoke his perceived exemption to the Data Protection Act, namely, those listed in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Schedule 2. These exemptions are, in full, below:

 

“1. The data subject has given his consent to the processing.

2. The processing is necessary-

(a) for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party, or

(b) for the taking of steps at the request of the data subject with a view to entering into a contract.

3. The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract.

4. The processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject.”

It is the Claimants contention that the Defendants supposed right of obtaining an exemption is not contained within any of these paragraphs – taking each in turn with notation to give a clearer explanation;

 

1. The data subject has given his consent to the processing.

 

That consent, as no legal agreement exists, therefore, also does not exist.

 

2. The processing is necessary-

(a) for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party, or

(b) for the taking of steps at the request of the data subject with a view to entering into a contract.

 

For both (a) and (b), there is no contract in existence.

 

3. The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract.

 

According to the Information Commissioners Office (Information Commissioners Office), exemption 3 includes all other statutory obligations for which the interests of national security and welfare override personal privacy. These obligations allow for the provision of data to Official agencies and organisations, e.g. disclosure to crime prevention agencies (Police, Intelligence Services, etc), official Government agencies (DVLA, DSS, Passport Agency, etc.) and health authorities, etc., and for any other purpose not agreed within a civil contract.

 

The three major credit reference agencies are not Government bodies, nor official agencies, but are “for-profit” companies. None of these three agencies are listed in the appropriate Data Protection Act Schedule that names the specific organisations that are permitted any such exemption rights.

 

4. The processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject.”

 

With reference to the Information Commissioners Office again, this is interpreted as “anything that affects the data subject as a matter of life and death”. This clause is included in the Data Protection Act to permit data, like medical records or contact details, being disclosed in emergency situations. The Claimant does not believe that this case could be described as anything like a matter of life or death.

 

So, it is clear to see that there is neither statutory provision permitting the Defendant to assume continued processing rights of the Claimants data at his discretion, nor any exemption. The Claimant can then only assume that the Defendants is relying on the Common Law – as already discussed, above, no such contract is in existence.

 

31. The Claimant argues, therefore, that due to the non-agreed disclosure of personal data to third parties by the Defendant, without express written permission from the Claimant, that the Defendant has committed a criminal offence under s.35 Data Protection Act 1998.

 

32. The recording of “Default” information by the Defendant, without consent, against a credit file without having an agreement regulated under the CCA 1974, or a legal contract, or any processing by the Defendant of that data, in any manner, which would be unfair or inaccurate or which in any way, would breach The Data Protection Act 1998.

 

33. The Claimant requires that the Defendant cease from processing such data, or else that the Defendant does not begin to process any personal data of which the Claimant is subject insofar as that processing involves the communication or passing of personal data of which the Claimant is the subject to any third party and insofar as the said data relates wholly or in part to the implementation by the Defendant of alleged defaults or contractual breaches, or breaches contrary to The Common Law.

 

34. The Claimant argues that the processing or continued processing by the Defendant of the said data will affect the Claimants credit rating and reputation and cause substantial damage and/or substantial distress to the Claimant and other family members in addition to that which has been caused to date. And that as the processing of the said data in the way referred to in this Claim would violate both the Principles and Data Subject’s rights of The Data Protection Act 1998, to do so would be both unwarranted and unlawful.

 

35. Additionally, the claimant requests an order from the Court under s.14(1) (for the erasure of the incorrect information, held by the Defendant) and s.14(3) (for the blocking or erasure of the data passed to Credit Reference Agencies, by the Defendant) of the Data Protection Act 1998, for the removal of any Default or Termination Notices and any other information relating to this agreement, that may cause prejudice or further damage to the Claimant;

 

“14. - (1) If a court is satisfied on the application of a data subject that personal data of which the applicant is the subject are inaccurate, the court may order the data controller to rectify, block, erase or destroy those data and any other personal data in respect of which he is the data controller and which contain an expression of opinion which appears to the court to be based on the inaccurate data.

 

14. – (3) Where the court—

(a) makes an order under subsection (1), or

(b) is satisfied on the application of a data subject that personal data of which he was the data subject and which have been rectified, blocked, erased or destroyed were inaccurate,

it may, where it considers it reasonably practicable, order the data controller to notify third parties to whom the data have been disclosed of the rectification, blocking, erasure or destruction.”

 

36. The Claimant further claims the Court fee of £65.

 

37. The Claimant therefore claims against the Defendant in the terms outlined in these particulars of claim and seeks;

37.1. Substantial damages from the Defendant to the value of £500.00 for each Default for the legal reasons outlined in Woodchester Lease Management Services Ltd v Swain & Co - [1998] All ER (D) 339 and Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All ER 119;

37.2. An order from the Court under s.14(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 for the removal of the Default Notice's and any other prejudicial information from all credit reference agencies;

37.3. Costs, at the discretion of the Court

 

 

Hadituptohere

[Hadituptohere]

Thankyou soooo much for your advise again Chris, as i have received this on a saturday morning and the court informed me that nothing was there friday evening, they will only possibly receive this on monday, when would you advise me contacting the court? should I give them time to read or go first thing monday as I had planned to do anyway?

 

Hadituptohere

Edited February 21, 2009 by Hadituptohere