cabot and monument debt

[overdone]

CABOT FINANCIAL

14 January 2009

 

Dear Overdone,

 

Repaying Your Account.

 

We've tried to contact you on several occasions and it's now vital that you contact Cabot urgently to discuss your account.

 

You currently owe £2627.80 and interest may be added to your account on a daily basis until a suitable repayment plan is agreed.

 

If we don't hear from you

 

If you don't contact us we will have to move your account to the next stage of our collection process.

 

Contacting Cabot

 

The most important thing for you to do now is to get in touch with us urgently to prevent further action being taken. Call 0845 0700 116 and one of our helpful customer advisors will discuss the options for repaying your account.

 

Our aim is to help customers get their accounts cleared - so do contact us immediately!

 

Yours sincerly

 

Peter Anderson

Edited January 16, 2009 by overdone
typo

[overdone]

The Monument Card in Post #62.

 

The Heading is incorrect if they want this to double as an Agreement, as they've neglected to include the word Card in the Title. That makes it improperly executed and enforceable only by a Court.

 

There are no Prescribed Terms contained within the four corners of the alleged Agreement, making it unenforceable, even by a Court.

 

I gather there is a 15k Loan of some sort, but I may've missed the details for that in the Thread.

 

Cabot are talking a lot of nonsense, which doesn't surprise many people I'm sure.

 

Cabot Confusion over Contained/Embodied/if any

 

They are having a good old crack at trying to word mangle the Act.

 

Contained means just that, the Prescribed Terms must be contained within the four corners of the Agreement. Contained does not mean these key Prescribed Terms can be found within another Document.

 

Embodied means an overall grouping of Terms, so can include General Terms found in another Document. The overall Agreement can embody general Terms found elsewhere, such as marketing bumf, or details about default charges etc, but the Act requires that the key Prescribed Terms must be contained, they cannot be embodied.

 

If any was inserted into the Act to include Verbal Agreements, i.e. where a Written Agreement may not have been made. If any does not mean if the Agreement was based upon a Written Agreement, and they have lost the Written Agreement they no longer have to produce it!

 

This is Section 61 from the Act:

 

 

 

The killer for them is s61(1)(a), because without that, a Court cannot Enforce because of s127(3).

 

The s61(1)(b) is not so important, because it's only concerned with the general Terms, they can make a mess of that, and a Court would still Enforce the alleged Agreement if they have complied with s61(1)(a).

 

Cabot are trying to mangle the two in order to try and imply that s61(1)(b) also applies to the Prescribed Terms, suggesting this means they can be embodied into the Agreement from another Document.

 

The killer is the fact that s127(3) does not mention the word embody, however, it does mention the word contain:

 

 

 

This is Cabot's attempt to mangle the above:

 

 

 

They are deliberately confusing general Terms with Prescribed Terms.

 

The bottom line is that in the case of the Credit Cards, they only have two improperly executed alleged Agreements, so must go to Court to stand any chance of being able to Enforce them.

 

The problem they will then face is s127(3), and the fact that a Court cannot Enforce either of them if they are missing the Prescribed Terms.

 

BRW

 

Interestingly, I did not reply to Cabot at all about the Monument Debt but perhaps they read BRW's post. They are back with this letter.

 

Cabot Financial.

 

Limited Offer.

 

Dear Overdone,

 

Monument Credit Card £2668.xx

 

Repaying your account-our offer to you

 

If you respond within the next 30 days from the date of this letter, we are able to offer you a discount of up to 30% to settle your account.

 

This is a limited offer which is only available for 30 days from the date of this letter. If you'd like to take advantage of this offer, please contact us immediately.

Alternatively, we may be able to offer you an atractive repayment plan which will enable you to repay your outstanding balance within 5 years.

 

Contacting Cabot.

 

The most important thing for you to do now is to get in touch with us immediately. Call xxxx xxxxx xxxx and one of our helpful customer advisors will discuss how to repay your account.

 

Yours sincerely

Alex Duncan.

Edited March 13, 2009 by overdone
spelling er

[overdone]

Now this one on Monument acc.

 

Cabot Financial.

 

Dear Overdone,

 

Your outstanding debt.

 

According to our records you currently owe £26xx.xx even though we have made repeated attempts to obtain your commitment to repay this debt. It is now vital that you contact us to discuss your account.

 

If we dont hear from you

 

If you don't contact us to agree a suitable repayment plan we will have to move your account to the next stage of the collections process.

 

Contacting Cabot

 

The most important thing for you to do now is to get in touch with us urgently, to prevent further action being taken. Call 0845 xxx xxx and one of our helpful customer advisors (telephone terrorists) will discuss the options for repaying your account. If you have difficulty hearing, our minicom number is xxxxxxxxx.

 

Our aim is to help customers get their accounts cleared - so contact us now.

 

Yours sincerely,

Alex Duncan

[overdone]

Raphaels Bank (ccrt uk) appears on my Experian credit file as an arrangement. Is this bank to do with Monument and if so since when?

Equifax have Compucredit uk (Monument) for the same debt on the Equifax File.

Who am I dealing with?

[davefirewalker]

Raphaels Bank (ccrt uk) appears on my Experian credit file as an arrangement. Is this bank to do with Monument and if so since when?

Equifax have Compucredit uk (Monument) for the same debt on the Equifax File.

Who am I dealing with?

 

When Monument was sold, Barclays took the share that they thought was better, and gave the rest to Compucredit. I am pretty sure that Raphaels bank owns compucredit or are at least involved with them.

 

in any case the agreement is unenforceable

 

Dave

[overdone]

They have no signed written permission to handle my information. Can I get them to remove any records from Credit Files?

[overdone]

a

 

The Argos Card in Post #46.

 

This is an Application Form.

 

The Heading is incorrect if they want this to double as an Agreement, as they've neglected to include the word Card in the Title. That makes it improperly executed and enforceable only by a Court.

 

There are no Prescribed Terms contained within the four corners of the alleged Agreement, making it unenforceable, even by a Court.

 

I can't see an Address for the Creditor.

 

I can't see that the Creditor has Signed it.

 

It mentions general Terms as being in another document, but that cannot apply to the Prescribed Terms...they must be contained within the four corners.

 

The Monument Card in Post #62.

 

The Heading is incorrect if they want this to double as an Agreement, as they've neglected to include the word Card in the Title. That makes it improperly executed and enforceable only by a Court.

 

There are no Prescribed Terms contained within the four corners of the alleged Agreement, making it unenforceable, even by a Court.

 

I gather there is a 15k Loan of some sort, but I may've missed the details for that in the Thread.

 

Cabot are talking a lot of nonsense, which doesn't surprise many people I'm sure.

 

Cabot Confusion over Contained/Embodied/if any

 

They are having a good old crack at trying to word mangle the Act.

 

Contained means just that, the Prescribed Terms must be contained within the four corners of the Agreement. Contained does not mean these key Prescribed Terms can be found within another Document.

 

Embodied means an overall grouping of Terms, so can include General Terms found in another Document. The overall Agreement can embody general Terms found elsewhere, such as marketing bumf, or details about default charges etc, but the Act requires that the key Prescribed Terms must be contained, they cannot be embodied.

 

If any was inserted into the Act to include Verbal Agreements, i.e. where a Written Agreement may not have been made. If any does not mean if the Agreement was based upon a Written Agreement, and they have lost the Written Agreement they no longer have to produce it!

 

This is Section 61 from the Act:

 

 

 

The killer for them is s61(1)(a), because without that, a Court cannot Enforce because of s127(3).

 

The s61(1)(b) is not so important, because it's only concerned with the general Terms, they can make a mess of that, and a Court would still Enforce the alleged Agreement if they have complied with s61(1)(a).

 

Cabot are trying to mangle the two in order to try and imply that s61(1)(b) also applies to the Prescribed Terms, suggesting this means they can be embodied into the Agreement from another Document.

 

The killer is the fact that s127(3) does not mention the word embody, however, it does mention the word contain:

 

 

 

This is Cabot's attempt to mangle the above:

 

 

 

They are deliberately confusing general Terms with Prescribed Terms.

 

The bottom line is that in the case of the Credit Cards, they only have two improperly executed alleged Agreements, so must go to Court to stand any chance of being able to Enforce them.

 

The problem they will then face is s127(3), and the fact that a Court cannot Enforce either of them if they are missing the Prescribed Terms.

 

 

BRW

Cabot have responded to the points made:

 

5 June 2009

 

Dear Overdone,

 

Our response to your letter

 

I refer to your letter dated 22 May 2009, and our previous correspondence in relation to your requestunder section 77/79 of the consumer credit act 1974.

 

Argos store card

 

I note your comments in relation to your argos store card, regarding the form and content of the credit agreement and its enforceability.You state that the word "Card" has been omitted from it's title and is therefore improperly executed. You shall that you signed this credit agreement on 23rd April 2002. It appears that your assertions are based on the consumer credit agreements, amendement, regulations, which came into force on 31st May 2005. At the time your credit agreement was drafted, there were no requirements for the word "Card" to be included in its title.With regards to your comments relating to prescribed terms being contained within the four corners of the agreement, I shall reiterate the points raised in my previous letter and explain further.Your signature on the credit agreement is clearly supported by the statement, "this is a credit Agreement regulated by the consumer credit act 1974. Sign it only if you want to be legally bound by its terms.In order for you to sign this credit agreement, you were provided with the full terms and conditions, which contained all prescribed terms, as well as all general terms and conditions. I have enclosed a further copy of these terms and conditions for your ease of reference. You shall note at the top of the second page, it clearly states. "This is a copy of your agreement for you to keep..."(Yes and there is no signature of mine to say these are the ones I am supposed to have read and agreed to. The paper they are presented on look suspiciously new to me)By signing the credit agreement, you have acknowledged that you have read, understood and agree to be legally bound by it's terms. It is clear therefore, that the terms and conditions form a key part of your credit agreement and have provided to you prior to signing the document. Your signature is confirmation that you have read and agreed to the prescribed terms, before completing the agreement. We would therefor argue that the prescribed terms were contained within the credit agreement and all regulations and legislation relevant at the time have been complied with.

 

This matter has been referred to our assistant Legal Council and I can confirm that our position remains unchanged.

 

You state that there is no address for your creditor on this agreement, initially, I refer your attention to the Direct Debit instruction at the bottom of your agreement, which clearly states the address of Argos card services. Furthermore, you shall note on the copy of the terms and conditions, entitled "Credit agreement Regulated by the consumer credit act 1974," that the address of your creditor is located directly beneath the title.

 

I note that you cannot see that your agreement has been signed by Argos Card Services. I refer your attention to the right hand side of the declaration box, where you shall find a signature on behalf of your creditor, followed by a date stamp, confirming the date on which your agreement was executed.

 

In conclusion, with regards to your Argos Store Card Credit Agreement, it is clear that all relevant legislation and regulations have been adhered to and that your agreement has been properly executed and is enforceable. In light of these points, Cabot shall continue to enforce this debt against you.

 

Monument Credit Card.

 

Your comments in relation to your Monument credit card are similar to those made regarding your Argos store card. I have addressed your concerns relating to the heading of your Argos card Agreement. I shall use the same explanation for your Monument credit card agreement. You shall note that you signed this agreement on 5th december 2000. Once again, the consumer crdit agreements, amendement, regulations came into force on 31st May 2005. There was therefore no requirement for the word CARD to be included in the heading of your agreement.

 

You raise similar concerns regarding the prescribed terms of your Monument credit agreement as with your Argos store card agreement. I refer to my explaination above and again confirm that Cabots position remains unchanged in relation to this matter.

 

Your final concern relates to section 127(3) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. You shall note from this section of the Act, that the cort take into account if the debtor has suffered any prejudice by the contravention in question. Therefore, if this credit agreement had been improperly executed , we would argue that you have suffered no prejudice as a result of its execution.

 

In conclusion, we are perfectly within our rights to continue to enforce these agreements against you, as the credit agreements have been properly executed according to regulation at the time you entered into them. Therefor your accounts have been returned to our collections team for further collection proceedings.

 

I trust I have now clarified matters for you.

 

Yours sincerely,

Steve Perring

Edited June 11, 2009 by overdone
add info

[42man]

That is of course their view OD.....they will continue to say they are right, it could all go down to a judge at the end of the day.....have you sent SAR's to the original creditors to check the default notices too ?

[banker_rhymes_with]

Hello Overdone!

 

Sadly, they are right on the 2005 issue on the word Card, that came to light after I posted the above comments. I've edited many of the Posts made at the time to update...must've missed yours. My apologies.

 

The lack of the word Card was not a significant issue in any event, so better that they spotted that now, rather than in Court. Good of them to spot that and get it out of the way now, so not a major issue! Bury that now, and it won't come back later to embarrass you in Court.

 

However, the rest still stands. They are wrong on the key issues.

 

The Prescribed Terms cannot be found in another document. Their arguments there are trying to say they can, which won't hold water. Please read this, which may explain why:

 

63. I refer to the judgment of TUCKEY LJ in the case of Wilson and another v Hurstanger Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 299"[11] Schedule 1 to the 1983 Regulations sets out the "information to be contained in documents embodying regulated consumer Credit Agreements". Some of this information mirrors the terms prescribed by Schedule 6, but some does not. Contrasting the provisions of the two schedules the Judge said:

 

“33 In my judgment the objective of Schedule 6 is to ensure that, as an inflexible condition of enforceability, certain basic minimum terms are included which the parties (with the benefit of legal advice if necessary) and/or the Court can identify within the four corners of the Agreement. Those minimum provisions combined with the requirement under s61 that all the terms should be in a single document, and backed up by the provisions of s127(3), ensure that these core terms are expressly set out in the Agreement itself: they cannot be orally agreed; they cannot be found in another document; they cannot be implied; and above all they cannot be in the slightest mis- stated. As a matter of policy, the lender is denied any room for manoeuvre in respect of them. On the other hand, they are basic provisions, and the only question for the Court is whether they are, on a true construction, included in the Agreement. More detailed requirements, which are designed to ensure that the Debtor is made aware, so far as possible, of specified information (including information contained in the minimum terms) are to be found in Schedule 1."

 

64. If the Agreement does not contain these terms in the prescribed manner it does not comply with section 60(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, the consequences of which means it is improperly executed and only enforceable by Court order.

 

65. Notwithstanding point 64, The Agreement must be signed in the prescribed manner to comply with Section 61(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. If the Agreement is not signed by Debtor or Creditor, it is also improperly executed and again only enforceable by Court order, although without a Debtor’s Signature, enforcement would not be possible.

 

66. I now wish to make reference to an excerpt of case law from the case of Wilson v Robertsons (London) Ltd [2005] EWHC 1425 (Ch).

 

67. In Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816, [2003] 4 All ER 97, the House of Lords explained that the 1974 Act was, like the Moneylenders Act 1927 before it, designed to tackle a significant social problem. The activities of some moneylenders have given the money lending business a bad reputation. Something had to be done to protect the borrower, who frequently, indeed normally, would be in a weak bargaining position. Protection of borrowers is the social policy behind the legislation. Part of that policy is to be achieved by setting stringent rules, which have to be complied with by the lender if his money lending Agreement is to be enforceable. The strictness of the discipline imposed on lenders is illustrated by the following passage in the speech of Lord Nicholls:

 

"72. Undoubtedly, as illustrated by the facts of the present case, section 127(3) may be drastic, even harsh, in its adverse consequences for a lender. He loses all his right under the Agreement, including his rights to any security which has been lodged. Conversely, the borrower acquires what can only be described as a windfall. He keeps the money and recovers his security. These consequences apply just as much where the lender was acting in good faith throughout and the error was due to a mistaken reading of the complex statutory requirements as in the case of deliberate non- compliance. These consequences also apply where, as in the present case, the borrower suffered no prejudice as a result of the non-compliance as they do where the borrower was misled. Parliament was painting here with a broad brush.

 

73. The unattractive feature of this approach is that it will sometimes involve punishing the blameless pour encourager les autres. On its face, considered in the context of one particular case, a sanction having this effect is difficult to justify. The Moneylenders Act 1927 adopted a similarly severe approach…

 

74. Despite [criticism in the Crowther report] I have no difficulty in accepting that in suitable instances it is open to Parliament, when Parliament considers the public interest so requires, deciding that failure to comply with certain formalities is an essential prerequisite to enforcement of certain types of Agreements. This course is open to Parliament even though this will sometimes yield a seemingly unreasonable result in a particular case. Considered overall, this course may well be a proportionate response in practice to a perceived social problem. Parliament may consider the response should be a uniform solution across the board. A tailor-made response, fitting the facts of each case as decided in an application to the Court, may not be appropriate. This may be considered an insufficient incentive and insufficient deterrent. And it may fail to protect consumers adequately…"

 

68. The message from the case of Wilson v Robertsons (London) Ltd [2005] EWHC 1425 (Ch), is that the Consumer Credit Act is clearly enacted to protect consumers such as myself and therefore the Claimant’s failures to supply the information and their general behaviour in this matter should be noted accordingly, giving consideration to the case law and the facts as set out within this Defence.

 

69. Therefore, the Claimant must provide an original copy of the Agreement compliant with the regulations as laid out in points 59 to 69 of this Defence to have any right of enforcement. This is the Document that I requested many times, all to no avail.

 

The Court’s Power of Enforcement

 

70. The Court’s powers of enforcement where Agreements are improperly executed by way of Section 65 are themselves subject to certain qualifying factors. Under Section 127(3) Consumer Credit Act 1974 the requirements are laid out clearly what is required for the Court to be able to enforce the Agreement where Section 65(1) has not been complied with. Section 127(3) The Court shall not make an enforcement order under section 65(1) if section 61(1)(a) (signing of Agreements) was not complied with unless a document (whether or not in the prescribed form and complying with regulations under section 60(1) itself containing all the Prescribed Terms of the Agreement was signed by the Debtor or hirer (whether or not in the prescribed manner).

 

71. Furthermore the Courts attention is also drawn to the authority of the House of Lords in Wilson-v- FCT [2003] All ER (D) 187 (Jul) which confirms that where a document does not contain the required terms under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) and Consumer Credit (Agreements) (Amendment) Regulations 2004 (SI2004/1482) the Agreement cannot be enforced.

 

72. With regards to the Authority cited in point 16, I refer to LORD NICHOLLS OF BIRKENHEAD in the House of Lords Wilson v First County Trust Ltd - [2003] All ER (D) 187 (Jul):

 

“28. I should outline the salient provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Subject to exemptions, a regulated Agreement is an Agreement between an individual Debtor and another person by which the latter provides the former with a cash loan or other financial accommodation not exceeding a specified amount. Currently the amount is £25,000. Section 61(1) sets out conditions which must be satisfied if a regulated Agreement is to be treated as properly executed. One of these conditions, in paragraph (a), is that the Agreement must be in a prescribed form containing all the Prescribed Terms. The Prescribed Terms are the amount of the credit or the credit limit, rate of interest (in some cases), how the borrower is to discharge his obligations, and any power the creditor may have to vary what is payable: Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983, Schedule 6. The consequence of improper execution is that the Agreement is not enforceable against the Debtor save by an order of the Court: Section 65(1). Section 127(1) provides what is to happen on an application for an enforcement order under Section 65. The Court 'shall dismiss' the application if, but only if, the Court considers it just to do so having regard to the prejudice caused to any person by the contravention in question and the degree of culpability for it. The Court may reduce the amount payable by the Debtor so as to compensate him for prejudice suffered as a result of the contravention, or impose conditions, or suspend the operation of any term of the order or make consequential changes in the Agreement or security.

 

29. The Court's powers under Section 127(1) are subject to significant qualification in two types of cases. The first type is where section 61(1)(a), regarding signing of Agreements, is not complied with. In such cases the Court 'shall not make' an enforcement order unless a document, whether or not in the prescribed form, containing all the Prescribed Terms, was signed by the Debtor: section 127(3). Thus, signature of a document containing all the Prescribed Terms is an essential prerequisite to the Court's power to make an enforcement order. The second type of case concerns failure to comply with the duty to supply a copy of an executed or unexecuted Agreement pursuant to Sections 62 and 63, or failure to comply with the duty to give notice of Cancellation rights in accordance with section 64(1). Here again, subject to one exception regarding Sections 62 and 63, Section 127(4) precludes the Court from making an enforcement order.

 

30. These restrictions on enforcement of a Regulated Agreement cannot be sidestepped... In the present case the essence of the complaint is that section 127(3) of the Consumer Credit Act has the effect that a Regulated Agreement is not enforceable unless a document containing all the Prescribed Terms is signed by the Debtor.

 

49. ".............The message to be gleaned from sections 65, 106, 113 and 127 of the Consumer Credit Act is that where a Court dismisses an application for an enforcement order under section 65 the lender is intended by Parliament to be left without recourse against the borrower in respect of the loan. That being the consequence intended by Parliament, the lender cannot assert at common law that the borrower has been unjustly enriched.

 

50. This interpretation of the Consumer Credit Act accords with the approach adopted by the House in Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95, regarding section 6 of the Moneylenders Act 1927 and, more recently, in Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384, another case where section 127(3) precluded the making of an enforcement order. In Dimond's case the restitutionary remedy sought was payment of the hire charge for a replacement car used by Mrs Dimond. The House rejected a claim advanced on the basis of unjust enrichment. Lord Hoffmann observed that Parliament contemplated that a Debtor might be enriched consequential upon non-enforcement of an Agreement pursuant to the statutory provisions. It was not open to the Court to say this consequence is unjust and should be reversed by a remedy at common law: [2002] 1 AC 384, 397-398.

 

73. The judgment of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead clearly sets out that without a Credit Agreement the Claimant's case cannot succeed.

 

74. I therefore respectfully request that the Court order the Claimant produce the Original signed Agreement before the Court to show the form and content of it and that it complies with the Regulations referred to in this Defence, otherwise the Court’s powers of enforcement are surely limited in these circumstances.

 

75. Furthermore, the Defendant requires clarification on the status of the original Agreement, if such ever existed. If the document is no longer in existence the Defendant requires certification of destruction and furthermore the Defendant will call into question the validity of any purported copy of the said contract where the original has been destroyed. The Defendant will require production of details as to when any copy was made and what medium the copy has been stored on along with clarification of who has had access to the document. I will also require written clarification that any copy document produced is authentic. Suitable Document checking, copying and destruction Policy notes must also be provided, backed up by Audit Logs to confirm how such Policies were carried out, checked and maintained. The Defendant notes that the Civil Procedure Rules also require the original documents to be made available under Practice Direction 32.

 

76. I also refer to the following quotation obtained from the Website of Francis Bennion, who was the draftsman of the Consumer Credit Act 1974:

 

Consumer Credit Act 1974 s 127(3):

 

"As the draftsman of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 I would like to thank Dr Richard Lawson for his interesting and well-argued article (30 August 2003) on Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 4 All ER 97. Dr Lawson may be interested to know that I included the provision in question (section 127(3)) entirely on my own initiative. It seemed right to me that if the creditor company couldn't be bothered to ensure that all the prescribed particulars were accurately included in the Credit Agreement it deserved to find it unenforceable, and that the Court should not have power to relieve it from this penalty. Nobody queried this, and it went through Parliament without debate. I'm glad the House of Lords has now vindicated my reasoning and confirmed that nobody's human rights were infringed.

 

167 Justice of the Peace (2003) 773.

77. The Defendant is under the belief that in the case of Rankine v Barclays Bank Plc [2005] on appeal from Stafford County Court the issue of the loss of the original, or destruction of the original Credit Agreement was central to the case and the Defendant is under the belief that the outcome of the case was that where the original Agreement could not be produced the claim could not succeed and that the appeal was successful.

 

78. I would also like to draw the Court’s attention to the requirements of CPR Practice Direction 16 7.3, which states:

 

7.3 Where a claim is based upon a written Agreement:

 

(1) a copy of the contract or documents constituting the Agreement should be attached to or served with the particulars of claim and the original(s) should be available at the hearing

 

79. Should the Claimant be unable to produce the original Agreement signed by both Debtor and Creditor and containing the Prescribed Terms, I request that the Court uses its powers under Section 142 Consumer Credit Act 1974 and declare the Agreement as unenforceable.

 

The next area to consider, is the issue of Default Notices and Termination.

 

I haven't time now to read back through the Thread, but if you can update on those issues, I would think you may well have a 2nd major issue against them if the Default/Termination was handled unlawfully.

 

Hope this helps.

 

Cheers,

BRW

[overdone]

My thanks to both BRW and 42man. I feel another letter coming on and may have to S A R both monument and Argos. Still awaiting S A R response from Cabot.

[overdone]

Today I have sent them a S.A.R for all three accounts and a ten pound Postal Order.

 

How long do they have to fulfil the SAR request? 22cnd May I sent it. Am I right to think that they cannot pursue court action whilst in breach of this?

[overdone]

Cabot Financial.

 

30 June 2009

 

Dear Overdone,

 

Re. The Funding Corporation.

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE. PLEASE DO NOT IGNORE.

 

We wish to advise you that your account continues to be in default. Despite previous correspondence and requests from us, you have failed to settle, or set up an arrangement on your account. Accordingly, the outstanding balance is payable immediately.

 

IF YOU DO NOT TAKE ACTION.

 

If you do not take any positive action to settle the outstanding balance with us immediately, we will either forward your account to an external debt collection agent or commence legal action to recover this debt if your account meets our litigation criteria.

Please note, that if we commence legal proceedings further costs and interests may be applied to your debt as part of a county court judgement.

 

Yours sincerely,

Lindsay Thomas

Senior Recoveries Manager

[overdone]

Well my SAR arrived special delivery a few days ago. What am I looking for amongst this pile of paper?

[The GodMother]

Well my SAR arrived special delivery a few days ago. What am I looking for amongst this pile of paper?

 

Firstly u need to look for a exacuted CCA. U also need to look for statements and see if there are any charges etc. Also u need a copy of the Deafult notice and notice of assigments etc.

 

Just the standard stuff really.

[colin2504]

I have been passed to Cabot about an old halifax account I thought I had closed. Then there was payments for £3800 out of the account. I reported this to the police and got a crime number, How do I pass this to cabot and can they chase me after they recieve this ??

[The GodMother]

just write to cabot

 

summing like this.

 

I do not acknowledge any debt to tjis company or any company u claim to represent.

 

Dear dumb idiot.

 

I am writing re the alleged debt on the above mentioned account.

 

i believe the alleged debt is done threw fraud and as result i have passed this matter onto the local police force who have given me crime referance number XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.

 

I trust this now means u will not be contacting me again.

 

Yours

[overdone]

63. I refer to the judgment of TUCKEY LJ in the case of Wilson and another v Hurstanger Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 299"[11] Schedule 1 to the 1983 Regulations sets out the "information to be contained in documents embodying regulated consumer Credit Agreements". Some of this information mirrors the terms prescribed by Schedule 6, but some does not. Contrasting the provisions of the two schedules the Judge said:

 

“33 In my judgment the objective of Schedule 6 is to ensure that, as an inflexible condition of enforceability, certain basic minimum terms are included which the parties (with the benefit of legal advice if necessary) and/or the Court can identify within the four corners of the Agreement. Those minimum provisions combined with the requirement under s61 that all the terms should be in a single document, and backed up by the provisions of s127(3), ensure that these core terms are expressly set out in the Agreement itself: they cannot be orally agreed; they cannot be found in another document; they cannot be implied; and above all they cannot be in the slightest mis- stated. As a matter of policy, the lender is denied any room for manoeuvre in respect of them. On the other hand, they are basic provisions, and the only question for the Court is whether they are, on a true construction, included in the Agreement. More detailed requirements, which are designed to ensure that the Debtor is made aware, so far as possible, of specified information (including information contained in the minimum terms) are to be found in Schedule 1."

 

64. If the Agreement does not contain these terms in the prescribed manner it does not comply with section 60(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, the consequences of which means it is improperly executed and only enforceable by Court order.

 

65. Notwithstanding point 64, The Agreement must be signed in the prescribed manner to comply with Section 61(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. If the Agreement is not signed by Debtor or Creditor, it is also improperly executed and again only enforceable by Court order, although without a Debtor’s Signature, enforcement would not be possible.

 

66. I now wish to make reference to an excerpt of case law from the case of Wilson v Robertsons (London) Ltd [2005] EWHC 1425 (Ch).

 

67. In Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816, [2003] 4 All ER 97, the House of Lords explained that the 1974 Act was, like the Moneylenders Act 1927 before it, designed to tackle a significant social problem. The activities of some moneylenders have given the money lending business a bad reputation. Something had to be done to protect the borrower, who frequently, indeed normally, would be in a weak bargaining position. Protection of borrowers is the social policy behind the legislation. Part of that policy is to be achieved by setting stringent rules, which have to be complied with by the lender if his money lending Agreement is to be enforceable. The strictness of the discipline imposed on lenders is illustrated by the following passage in the speech of Lord Nicholls:

 

"72. Undoubtedly, as illustrated by the facts of the present case, section 127(3) may be drastic, even harsh, in its adverse consequences for a lender. He loses all his right under the Agreement, including his rights to any security which has been lodged. Conversely, the borrower acquires what can only be described as a windfall. He keeps the money and recovers his security. These consequences apply just as much where the lender was acting in good faith throughout and the error was due to a mistaken reading of the complex statutory requirements as in the case of deliberate non- compliance. These consequences also apply where, as in the present case, the borrower suffered no prejudice as a result of the non-compliance as they do where the borrower was misled. Parliament was painting here with a broad brush.

 

73. The unattractive feature of this approach is that it will sometimes involve punishing the blameless pour encourager les autres. On its face, considered in the context of one particular case, a sanction having this effect is difficult to justify. The Moneylenders Act 1927 adopted a similarly severe approach…

 

74. Despite [criticism in the Crowther report] I have no difficulty in accepting that in suitable instances it is open to Parliament, when Parliament considers the public interest so requires, deciding that failure to comply with certain formalities is an essential prerequisite to enforcement of certain types of Agreements. This course is open to Parliament even though this will sometimes yield a seemingly unreasonable result in a particular case. Considered overall, this course may well be a proportionate response in practice to a perceived social problem. Parliament may consider the response should be a uniform solution across the board. A tailor-made response, fitting the facts of each case as decided in an application to the Court, may not be appropriate. This may be considered an insufficient incentive and insufficient deterrent. And it may fail to protect consumers adequately…"

 

68. The message from the case of Wilson v Robertsons (London) Ltd [2005] EWHC 1425 (Ch), is that the Consumer Credit Act is clearly enacted to protect consumers such as myself and therefore the Claimant’s failures to supply the information and their general behaviour in this matter should be noted accordingly, giving consideration to the case law and the facts as set out within this Defence.

 

69. Therefore, the Claimant must provide an original copy of the Agreement compliant with the regulations as laid out in points 59 to 69 of this Defence to have any right of enforcement. This is the Document that I requested many times, all to no avail.

 

The Court’s Power of Enforcement

 

70. The Court’s powers of enforcement where Agreements are improperly executed by way of Section 65 are themselves subject to certain qualifying factors. Under Section 127(3) Consumer Credit Act 1974 the requirements are laid out clearly what is required for the Court to be able to enforce the Agreement where Section 65(1) has not been complied with. Section 127(3) The Court shall not make an enforcement order under section 65(1) if section 61(1)(a) (signing of Agreements) was not complied with unless a document (whether or not in the prescribed form and complying with regulations under section 60(1) itself containing all the Prescribed Terms of the Agreement was signed by the Debtor or hirer (whether or not in the prescribed manner).

 

71. Furthermore the Courts attention is also drawn to the authority of the House of Lords in Wilson-v- FCT [2003] All ER (D) 187 (Jul) which confirms that where a document does not contain the required terms under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) and Consumer Credit (Agreements) (Amendment) Regulations 2004 (SI2004/1482) the Agreement cannot be enforced.

 

72. With regards to the Authority cited in point 16, I refer to LORD NICHOLLS OF BIRKENHEAD in the House of Lords Wilson v First County Trust Ltd - [2003] All ER (D) 187 (Jul):

 

“28. I should outline the salient provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Subject to exemptions, a regulated Agreement is an Agreement between an individual Debtor and another person by which the latter provides the former with a cash loan or other financial accommodation not exceeding a specified amount. Currently the amount is £25,000. Section 61(1) sets out conditions which must be satisfied if a regulated Agreement is to be treated as properly executed. One of these conditions, in paragraph (a), is that the Agreement must be in a prescribed form containing all the Prescribed Terms. The Prescribed Terms are the amount of the credit or the credit limit, rate of interest (in some cases), how the borrower is to discharge his obligations, and any power the creditor may have to vary what is payable: Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983, Schedule 6. The consequence of improper execution is that the Agreement is not enforceable against the Debtor save by an order of the Court: Section 65(1). Section 127(1) provides what is to happen on an application for an enforcement order under Section 65. The Court 'shall dismiss' the application if, but only if, the Court considers it just to do so having regard to the prejudice caused to any person by the contravention in question and the degree of culpability for it. The Court may reduce the amount payable by the Debtor so as to compensate him for prejudice suffered as a result of the contravention, or impose conditions, or suspend the operation of any term of the order or make consequential changes in the Agreement or security.

 

29. The Court's powers under Section 127(1) are subject to significant qualification in two types of cases. The first type is where section 61(1)(a), regarding signing of Agreements, is not complied with. In such cases the Court 'shall not make' an enforcement order unless a document, whether or not in the prescribed form, containing all the Prescribed Terms, was signed by the Debtor: section 127(3). Thus, signature of a document containing all the Prescribed Terms is an essential prerequisite to the Court's power to make an enforcement order. The second type of case concerns failure to comply with the duty to supply a copy of an executed or unexecuted Agreement pursuant to Sections 62 and 63, or failure to comply with the duty to give notice of Cancellation rights in accordance with section 64(1). Here again, subject to one exception regarding Sections 62 and 63, Section 127(4) precludes the Court from making an enforcement order.

 

30. These restrictions on enforcement of a Regulated Agreement cannot be sidestepped... In the present case the essence of the complaint is that section 127(3) of the Consumer Credit Act has the effect that a Regulated Agreement is not enforceable unless a document containing all the Prescribed Terms is signed by the Debtor.

 

49. ".............The message to be gleaned from sections 65, 106, 113 and 127 of the Consumer Credit Act is that where a Court dismisses an application for an enforcement order under section 65 the lender is intended by Parliament to be left without recourse against the borrower in respect of the loan. That being the consequence intended by Parliament, the lender cannot assert at common law that the borrower has been unjustly enriched.

 

50. This interpretation of the Consumer Credit Act accords with the approach adopted by the House in Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95, regarding section 6 of the Moneylenders Act 1927 and, more recently, in Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384, another case where section 127(3) precluded the making of an enforcement order. In Dimond's case the restitutionary remedy sought was payment of the hire charge for a replacement car used by Mrs Dimond. The House rejected a claim advanced on the basis of unjust enrichment. Lord Hoffmann observed that Parliament contemplated that a Debtor might be enriched consequential upon non-enforcement of an Agreement pursuant to the statutory provisions. It was not open to the Court to say this consequence is unjust and should be reversed by a remedy at common law: [2002] 1 AC 384, 397-398.

 

73. The judgment of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead clearly sets out that without a Credit Agreement the Claimant's case cannot succeed.

 

74. I therefore respectfully request that the Court order the Claimant produce the Original signed Agreement before the Court to show the form and content of it and that it complies with the Regulations referred to in this Defence, otherwise the Court’s powers of enforcement are surely limited in these circumstances.

 

75. Furthermore, the Defendant requires clarification on the status of the original Agreement, if such ever existed. If the document is no longer in existence the Defendant requires certification of destruction and furthermore the Defendant will call into question the validity of any purported copy of the said contract where the original has been destroyed. The Defendant will require production of details as to when any copy was made and what medium the copy has been stored on along with clarification of who has had access to the document. I will also require written clarification that any copy document produced is authentic. Suitable Document checking, copying and destruction Policy notes must also be provided, backed up by Audit Logs to confirm how such Policies were carried out, checked and maintained. The Defendant notes that the Civil Procedure Rules also require the original documents to be made available under Practice Direction 32.

 

76. I also refer to the following quotation obtained from the Website of Francis Bennion, who was the draftsman of the Consumer Credit Act 1974:

 

Consumer Credit Act 1974 s 127(3):

 

"As the draftsman of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 I would like to thank Dr Richard Lawson for his interesting and well-argued article (30 August 2003) on Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 4 All ER 97. Dr Lawson may be interested to know that I included the provision in question (section 127(3)) entirely on my own initiative. It seemed right to me that if the creditor company couldn't be bothered to ensure that all the prescribed particulars were accurately included in the Credit Agreement it deserved to find it unenforceable, and that the Court should not have power to relieve it from this penalty. Nobody queried this, and it went through Parliament without debate. I'm glad the House of Lords has now vindicated my reasoning and confirmed that nobody's human rights were infringed.

 

167 Justice of the Peace (2003) 773.

77. The Defendant is under the belief that in the case of Rankine v Barclays Bank Plc [2005] on appeal from Stafford County Court the issue of the loss of the original, or destruction of the original Credit Agreement was central to the case and the Defendant is under the belief that the outcome of the case was that where the original Agreement could not be produced the claim could not succeed and that the appeal was successful.

 

78. I would also like to draw the Court’s attention to the requirements of CPR Practice Direction 16 7.3, which states:

 

7.3 Where a claim is based upon a written Agreement:

 

(1) a copy of the contract or documents constituting the Agreement should be attached to or served with the particulars of claim and the original(s) should be available at the hearing

 

79. Should the Claimant be unable to produce the original Agreement signed by both Debtor and Creditor and containing the Prescribed Terms, I request that the Court uses its powers under Section 142 Consumer Credit Act 1974 and declare the Agreement as unenforceable.

[overdone]

Essentially, I put the above post from BRW into letter form and Cabot are not very impressed. This is their reply.

 

CABOT FINANCIAL

 

Dear Overdone,

 

I refer to your letter dated 9 June 2009 and our previous correspondence.

 

Cabot has previously responded to the issues you have raised and our position remains unchanged. I would, with respect, advise you that you have been misinformed in relation to the arguments you continue to raise and you have no grounds for your continued dispute and failure to repay your financial liabilities.

 

As previously advised, the requirements of the Consumer Credit (Agreement) regulations 1983/1553 concerning the form and content of the agreement are enforced by the primary legislation which is The Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA) more specifically section 60 (1) which states "The secretary of state shall make regulations as to the form and content of the documents" As a result, one is required to view the primary legislation together with the secondary legislation and therefore our explanation as set out on previous occasions that the terms of the agreement can be set out in another document is legally accurate.

 

On reviewing your account, it is evident from correspondence that you are delaying repayment of this account. However, it is the case that you signed and agreed to the terms of the credit agreement in order to receive and utilise a credit card. It is also clear from statements, which you have received previously that you have had the benefit of the funds available to you and that you have failed to fully repay this. In addition you have previously made payments to Monument, which again is clear evidence that you acknowledge responsibility for the above account.

 

Cabot will not enter in to any further correspondence with you regarding this matter as we have continually responded to the issues you have raised. The balance on your account is £2,738.88 and we have placed your account on hold for 7 days during which time we require you to contact our collections department on xxx xxxxx to arrange a repayment plan. Failing which, your account will be escalated in our collections process.

 

Yours sincerely

 

Lucy O'Hara

Edited July 17, 2009 by overdone
typo

[The GodMother]

spitting there dummy i see

[banker_rhymes_with]

Hello Overdone!

 

Many thanks for the PM, I'll try to help.

 

CABOT FINANCIAL

 

Dear Overdone,

 

I refer to your letter dated 9 June 2009 and our previous correspondence.

 

Cabot has previously responded to the issues you have raised and our position remains unchanged. I would, with respect, advise you that you have been misinformed in relation to the arguments you continue to raise and you have no grounds for your continued dispute and failure to repay your financial liabilities.

Well, they would say that, would they not!

 

As previously advised, the requirements of the Consumer Credit (Agreement) regulations 1983/1553 concerning the form and content of the agreement are enforced by the primary legislation which is The Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA) more specifically section 60 (1) which states "The secretary of state shall make regulations as to the form and content of the documents" As a result, one is required to view the primary legislation together with the secondary legislation and therefore our explanation as set out on previous occasions that the terms of the agreement can be set out in another document is legally accurate.

There they go again, trying to bluff their way past s61(1)(a)!

 

General Terms can be embodied into the Agreement from somewhere else, even nailed to a Tree with a little flag, but the Prescribed Terms must be contained within the four corners of the Agreement.

 

Sorry if you have seen this elsewhere, but this is how it works:

 

The Consumer Credit Act 1974

 

The Prescribed Terms are not covered by s61(1)(b), but by s61(1)(a). There's a key difference! One uses the word Contained and only in relation to Prescribed Terms, whereas the other uses the word Embodied, and in relation to General Terms.

 

The Act does not say the Prescribed Terms can be embodied into an Agreement from another document, whereas it does say, clearly, that the Prescribed Terms must be Contained. Lock in to that word, as it is the key to the issue.

 

Do not let them hood wink you by claiming s61(1)(b) covers the Prescribed Terms, because it does not. This issue has binding precedent:

 

I refer to the judgment of TUCKEY LJ in the case of Wilson and another v Hurstanger Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 299"[11] Schedule 1 to the 1983 Regulations sets out the "information to be contained in documents embodying regulated consumer Credit Agreements". Some of this information mirrors the terms prescribed by Schedule 6, but some does not. Contrasting the provisions of the two schedules the Judge said:

 

“33 In my judgment the objective of Schedule 6 is to ensure that, as an inflexible condition of enforceability, certain basic minimum terms are included which the parties (with the benefit of legal advice if necessary) and/or the Court can identify within the four corners of the Agreement. Those minimum provisions combined with the requirement under s61 that all the terms should be in a single document, and backed up by the provisions of s127(3), ensure that these core terms are expressly set out in the Agreement itself: they cannot be orally agreed; they cannot be found in another document; they cannot be implied; and above all they cannot be in the slightest mis-stated. As a matter of policy, the lender is denied any room for manoeuvre in respect of them. On the other hand, they are basic provisions, and the only question for the Court is whether they are, on a true construction, included in the Agreement. More detailed requirements, which are designed to ensure that the Debtor is made aware, so far as possible, of specified information (including information contained in the minimum terms) are to be found in Schedule 1."

The way it works is this. You look at the Agreement, and see if the Prescribed Terms are clearly there, and have not been mis-stated, and do not need to refer to another document to explain them. The section of the Act that covers this basic issue is s61:

 

Signing of agreement.

 

61.

 

(1) A regulated agreement is not properly executed unless -

 

(a) a document in the prescribed form itself containing all the prescribed terms and conforming to regulations under section 60(1) is signed in the prescribed manner both by the debtor or hirer and by or on behalf of the creditor or owner, and

 

(b) the document embodies all the terms of the agreement, other than implied terms, and

 

© the document is, when presented or sent to the debtor or hirer for signature, in such a state that all its terms are readily legible

So, if the Prescribed Terms are not contained within the four corners of the Agreement, then we can move on to the next issue, i.e. the consequences of this omission:

 

Consequences of improper execution.

 

65.

 

(1) An improperly-executed regulated agreement is enforceable against the debtor or hirer on an order of the court only.

 

(2) A retaking of goods or land to which a regulated agreement relates is an enforcement of the agreement.

Right, s61 tells us that if the Prescribed Terms are not contained within the four corners of the Agreement, then the Agreement is not properly executed. We also now know from s65 that it if it's not properly executed, it can only be enforced by a Court.

 

However, if the Agreement was signed before the Consumer Credit Act 2006, then the Court cannot enforce because of s127(3). Notice how that naughty little word contained crops up yet again!

 

Enforcement orders in cases of infringement.

 

127.

 

(1) In the case of an application for an enforcement order under -

 

(a) section 65(1)(improperly executed agreements), or

 

(b) section 105(7)(a) or (b)(improperly executed security instruments), or

 

© section 111(2)(failure to serve copy of notice on surety), or

 

(d) section 124(1) or (2)(taking of negotiable instrument in contravention of section 123),

the court shall dismiss the application if, but (subject to subsections (3) and (4)) only if, it considers it just to do so having regard to -

 

(i) prejudice caused to any person by the contravention in question, and the degree of culpability for it; and

 

(ii) the powers conferred on the court by subsection (2) and sections 135 and 136.

 

(2) If it appears to the court just to do so, it may in an enforcement order reduce or discharge any sum payable by the debtor or hirer, or any surety, so as to compensate him for prejudice suffered as a result of the contravention in question.

 

(3) The court shall not make an enforcement order under section 65(1) if section 61(1)(a)(signing of agreements) was not complied with unless a document (whether or not in the prescribed form and complying with regulations under section 60(1)) itself containing all the prescribed terms of the agreement was signed by the debtor or hirer (whether or not in the prescribed manner).

 

(4) The court shall not make an enforcement order under section 65(1) in the case of a cancellable agreement if -

 

(a) a provision of section 62 or 63 was not complied with, and the creditor or owner did not give a copy of the executed agreement, and of any other document referred to in it, to the debtor or hirer before the commencement of the proceedings in which the order is sought, or

 

(b) section 64(1) was not complied with.

 

(5) Where an enforcement order is made in a case to which subsection (3) applies, the order may direct that the regulated agreement is to have effect as if it did not include a term omitted from the document signed by the debtor or hirer.

Going back to their letter:

 

On reviewing your account, it is evident from correspondence that you are delaying repayment of this account. However, it is the case that you signed and agreed to the terms of the credit agreement in order to receive and utilise a credit card. It is also clear from statements, which you have received previously that you have had the benefit of the funds available to you and that you have failed to fully repay this. In addition you have previously made payments to Monument, which again is clear evidence that you acknowledge responsibility for the above account.

This is just hot air, and trying to bluff you into paying them. Typical DCA nonsense.

 

Cabot will not enter in to any further correspondence with you regarding this matter as we have continually responded to the issues you have raised. The balance on your account is £2,738.88 and we have placed your account on hold for 7 days during which time we require you to contact our collections department on xxx xxxxx to arrange a repayment plan. Failing which, your account will be escalated in our collections process.

There's not much to say to the above. They now say they won't communicate with you any further, and will escalate things within their nasty grabbing organisation if you don't call them and do exactly what they want you to do, i.e. get your Debit Card out and let them hoover it out for you at regular intervals, in any, or all at once.

 

I regret you have probably said all you can say, all you can do now is sit back and await their next move.

 

The Default Notice issue is one to take a good look at, and I would also waste no time and start planning your case against them. Keep reading on CAG, and start planning your strategy. Be ready for anything, and be aware they will no doubt resume Harassment activities to try and tease payment out of you.

 

That's what they do, they are not called Debt Collectors for nothing, so turning them off is near impossible. All you can do now is wait for them to get bored and move on, or try their luck with a Court Claim.

 

I hope this helps.

 

Cheers,

BRW

[overdone]

SAR

 

I have been going through the results of the SAR cabot sent me.

 

Argos Card

Some of the statements are missing.

Cabot actually defaulted this debt, yet no default letters included in SAR.

 

Monument

No statements.

Again defaulted by Cabot, but no copies of default letters in SAR.

 

With copies of their correspondence to me, some of the letters are generic and you cannot tell what account they relate to. There are just weird computer symbols instead of necessary details.

 

Does this mean my SAR is flawed?

Edited July 21, 2009 by overdone
add info again

[overdone]

Default procedure link.

http://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/debt-collection-industry/162255-link-financial-limited.html

 

Re: Link Financial Limited

"3rd June 2009

A Wetherby man has had over £15,000 of credit card debt written off after Bank of Scotland backed down minutes before the case was due to be heard in a Leeds court.

Judge Langham at Leeds County Court believes that the bank didnt fight the case because it feared highlighting failings and opening the floodgates to further claims.

Self-employed Mr Mitchell, 60, had a judgement against him after delaying payments to his credit card while he waited for the bank to supply specific information that he had requested on a number of occasions.

His case was won on an appeal that his credit card application didn't contain the prescribed terms and conditions and therefore didnt comply with the Consumer Credit Act.

The Bank of Scotland argued that the terms and conditions had been given as a separate document when Mr Mitchell applied for the card at the Wetherby branch of Halifax, but he denies ever receiving them.

However, under the law, a credit agreement is only binding if it is a single document that has been signed by both parties and contains all the prescribed terms.

Although the Bank of Scotland gave up its fight and agreed to write off Mr Mitchells debt, amazingly they refused to pay his costs.

However, as a final blow to the lender Judge Langham ruled that the bank needed to pay all the costs in full and said that the bank was trying to shy away from highlighting this issue.

Edited July 26, 2009 by overdone
adjustment to text

[The GodMother]

if they have not produced everything then yes it is flawed.

 

I would wrtie asking for the rest of the paperwork and give them 10 days to send it.

 

After the 10 days report to ICO.

[overdone]

Thank you godmother. I expect they do not know how to do things after all.

To the letter of the law.

[The GodMother]

what ever gave u the idea they know stuff in the first place?