sj - lost! but battle still continues?

[kel123]

I am quite calm but I pitty the person who crosses me in the next 24 hours:)

 

Yes I lost the SJ but no they did not win?

 

I will explain:

 

The judges introduction to me was: I know you are a litigant in person but because these are technical issues you will not be treated as such! I will be only dealing with your original defence because you have bought other things to the table.

 

I explained that I had entered a defence as directed, against the Sj. He asked if I had applied to amend my defence I had to answer No, I did say that that the original defence was a holding defence untill [problem] supplied all the paperwork and a request was in the original defence to amend, to which he replied Have you applied to ammend your defence.

 

I appologised and said I have learnt as I have gone along, to which he replied, you will not be treated as a litigant.

 

He then said he had a choice to make and this was It! The SJ will be heard today and that it can only be based arround my original defence no new evedance will be allowed and that the claiments sol/brief must stay within this. My defence will then be struck out and I will have 14 days to re-enter. (so the process restarts minus todays rulings)

 

I will tell you about these ruling abit later after I have had another beer.

 

I cannot say he was nasty with me but he made sure I know which foot was on top of me.

 

Like: Tother side started and I interjected with a disagreement. I was firmly told that I could not do this and that I could only address him. When tother side bought up Mcguffick and mentioned s77 I said to the judge, that is irrelavent this case is todo with s78, He turned on me and started to say I have said that you are not BUT I AM ADDRESSING YOU SIR, he hummed and accepted it.

 

Time for another beer

 

Searcher

 

How do I feel - somewhat shafted

[robcag]

Sorry to hear the result of your day in court

 

May as well take some beers with you to court next time if he's not going to let you speak

 

Cheers

Rob

[kel123]

The only two arguements open to me where:

 

Non complience with s78

 

and

 

No lloyds signature on the application form

 

Section 78

 

In feb 08 I applied for a copy of the executed agreement and terms and conditions.

 

2 and a half months later Lloyds supplied a poor copy of the agreement plus a terms and condition tiltled bank copy which was missing many sections

 

When they took me to court Jan 09 I used the T & C as non conforming because there was no reference to conclude that this was indeed a true copy. And did not match the particulars of claim.

 

Lloyds eventually typed out the terms and condition and sent them to me within a wittness statement stating that these are a true copy and a certificate signed by a lloyds team leader to verify that they are a true copy. The only reference that links the two are on the top of this typed t & c is Terms and conditions of credit card.

 

I argued that lord justice tuckey (wilson and a n o v haurstanger ldt) said that (33) it must be identifiable within the four corners of the document. and left the lender with no room to maouvur and therefore because the two cannot be referenced against each other then they have not complied with s78

 

the judge said I would need to see the rulling - I had typed out 33. but he ignored it and carried on.

 

Last gasp situation I came up with s78 (1) a, b and c non complience, again I had it typed out the judge borrowed my copy, underlined 'according to the information' gave it me back, and that was the end of that!

 

The ruling he gave on this:

 

The bank have provided a witness statement to the effect that these are a true copy of the t & c and I am satisfied that on the balance of probability, they are

 

Signature and costs later (costs are a goody)

[postggj]

Do You Have A Thread On This Kel23

[kel123]

Not has such postggj just bits and pieces spread around.

 

I will try and use this thread for my re-entered defence and that is based on miss-sold PPI (judge gave me permission to enter counter claim) and a minor discrepancy in the DN.

[kel123]

Anyoldhow now the lloyds signature: I'll give you his ruling first

 

A bank signature does not need to be 1) traceable 2) show intent (customers signature is enough as it is by his request) 3) have purpose.

 

In his summing up the judge basically backed away from being contravercial because he said this would have ramifications across the whole cival service, he said this while leaning back and laughing.

 

Because I had not mentioned my evedance in the original defence he would not allow me to bring in reports and saying that I had not declared it as expert evedance. Although it is in my standard disclosure list and within the defence he had already thrown out.

 

The judge saw me look in astonishment when he signed the new directions, guess what IT'S A SQUIGGLY LINE, Making sure he covers his ass me thinks?

[kel123]

OK Costs

 

The court nor myself had received the tother sides breakdown. He explained that under CPR cost needed to be awarded at the end of the case and asked me what I thought, I said that although these discions have gone against me it is not a proven SJ because I have been given permision to re enter a defence for the other matters.

 

He leant across his table towards me and said YOU LOST! he then leant back in his chair and said I could always make it simple and not allow you to re-enter your defence, but because neither of us have seen the breakdown, costs to be awarded at the end of the next hearing.

 

He then told us (me and tother side) to work out the rulings and and directions and to come back to him when we have done so.

[Sunshine54]

HI Kel

 

what an appalling attitude. It is a disgrace to his profession

 

I hope that I don't meet someone like him

good luck

S

[kel123]

I have in the past been careful about what I have said on open boards becuase walls have ears But sod um! if it only makes me feel better then i'll live with any ramifications

[kel123]

come on, comments please chappees and chapeses

 

Anyone think I have any grounds to appeal

[Docman]

Kel

 

You obviously lost on the judge lottery. His comments (the Judge could only have been a MAN) border on grounds for complaint. However, I suggest for the moment, you park that one and start to think about the case itself.

 

It looks like you have been ordered to file an amended defence within 14 days. Is that the case? I noted you said there are bits of your case posted on other threads. Can you direct us there or alternativley post up the original defence and the Particulars of Claim so that we can all comment and advise you.

[kel123]

Will do docman, but the original is of no use now because It has already been ruled against. the rulings make the poc acceptable but I will post them.

 

I will post up the orders/directions given today a little later because of time constaints now. Also what I have left to claim against. The original time for hearing has been given as 4 hours but the judge recomended that this be increased to a day case?

 

Just picked my wife up from work and she made a valid point, which was:

But you had the gaul to stand up against the institute and in many respects against the court, so what do you expect?

[supasnooper]

What a strange Judge you had.

 

How can he say that you lost a SJ but allow you to submit an amended defence ? I'm bemused to say the least.....

 

Anyway, onwards and upwards. If you do as Docman says, lets see what we can do.

[lilly white]

ok lets make the judge rock on his chair.

 

we need the poc.

[lilly white]

Also

 

The Cca

 

The Default Notice

 

Termination Notice

[kel123]

POC as of 5th Jan 2009

 

1. by agreement in writing & regulated by the consumer credit act 1974, the claiment issued to the defendant a lloyds tsb platinium card, for the purpose of the defendant aquirring goods/services on the card.

2. clause 7 of the agreement provided that the claiment would furnish the defendant with a monthly statement showing the balance currently due, the minimum payment to be made & the date of payment. if the balance was not paid, then provided the defendant made the minimum payment on or before such date, the remainder of the balance should remain outstanding & the defendant should pay interest upon it per month in accordance with clauses 5, 6 & 9 of the agreement

3. in breeching the agreement, the defendant failed to make payment & on the 22/07/08 the claiment issued a default notice pursuent to section 87(i) of the consumer credit act 1974

4. on the 21/10/08 the claiment did issue a formal demand to the defendant.

5. the claiments therefore claim the balance due under the agreement: ******.**

 

 

Thats it in full, in the t & c they supplied there was no clauses 5, 6, 7 or 9 but as I have already said the judge ruled this acceptable. It does say 87(i), this has not been argued yet?

 

All the dates are correct as well as the time scales

[lilly white]

Valid Default Notice

 

 

10. It is a condition precedent to the issue of Proceedings in respect of a Regulated agreement that certain steps prior to the issue of Proceedings must be taken. Specifically those steps are the issue of a valid default notice complying with the terms of the Act and the issue of a valid termination notice, also complying with the act.

 

 

11. It is not admitted that either a valid default notice or termination notice was ever served on me and the Claimant is put to strict proof.

 

 

12. It is noted that, to be valid, a Default Notice needs to be accurate in terms of both the scope and nature of breach and include an accurate figure required to remedy any such breach (Woodchester Lease Management Services Ltd v Swain & Co - [1998] All ER (D) 339). It must also allow a minimum of 14 days following date of service, in which to rectify any such breach. The prescribed format for such a document is further laid down in the Consumer Credit (Enforcement, Default and Termination Notices) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1561) and Amendment regulations The Consumer Credit (Enforcement, Default and Termination Notices) (Amendment) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/3094).

 

 

13. The Act also sets out via Section 88 that the Default Notice must be in the prescribed form and must allow the required time from date of service. The use of the word “must” indicates that this is mandatory and that it cannot be dismissed as a de minimus issue.

 

 

14. The Law in respect of service is governed by the Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 which indicates that service is deemed to be effectual on the day upon which the letter would be delivered in the usual course of business.

 

 

15. I refer to the practice direction, given by J R BICKFORD SMITH, Senior Master Queen's Bench Division, on8 March 1985 in relation to the Interpretation Act 1978, Section 7. It confirms that deemed service of documents sent by first class mail occurs on the 2nd business day after posting.

16. I further refer to CPR Part 6.26 Service of Documents which concurs with the above practice direction that the deemed date of service by first class post occurs:-

 

 

“The second day after it was posted, left with, delivered to or collected by the relevant service provider provided that day is a business day; or if not, the next business day after that day.”

 

 

17. The importance of CPR Part 6 and the Interpretation Act 1978 in determining the delivery of documents by ordinary post is further confirmed by the following Court of Appeal Case Consignia Plc v Sealy [2002] EWCA Civ 878 (19 June 2002).

 

 

18. For the avoidance of any doubt, in the event of an alleged breach by the Debtor this is at all times an Agreement Regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974. There is no provision in the Act that allows a large financial institution to terminate an Agreement that is in alleged default or breach simply by giving notice to the Consumer. Section 98(6) makes that quite clear. The Creditor must follow the steps outlined in Section 87 and Section 88 if they are to lawfully Default and Terminate, and enjoy the benefits of Section 87.

[lilly white]

Sums Claimed

 

 

26. It is not admitted that any or all of the monies claimed are lawfully owing. The Claimant is put to strict proof as to how the sums claimed have been calculated and as to how those sums are lawfully owing.

 

 

 

 

27. Further, it is denied that both the alleged contractual account charges and the contractual interest subsequently applied to those charges which have been claimed are lawfully owing in that it is submitted that the charges are a penalty in that they do not reflect any actual losses sustained by the claimant nor does it reflect realistically any actual costs incurred and so are in breach of the common law and in any event unfair within the meaning of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (“the UTCCR”)

 

 

 

 

28. In case the Claimant should attempt to justify the charges by reference to the Office of Fair Trading Report of April 2006 “Calculating Fair Default Charges in Credit Card Contracts” (“the OFT Report”) I would like to draw the court's attention to the detail of the OFT Report. The OFT Report did not state or give guidance that a level of £12 was fair; neither did it recommend this figure in any way, it was merely a statement of regulatory intent. The OFT Report set a threshold level of £12, below which it would not warrant regulatory intervention at that time (para 5.4 of the Report). The reason given for this was that their resources would be better directed at cases involving more serious economic detriment. Finally, the OFT Report specifically stated that the OFT had no power to constrain private civil actions or to determine what a court should decide (para 5.7) and that a court will certainly not consider that a default fee is fair just because it is below the threshold (para 5.5).

 

 

 

[lilly white]

I have yet to view the original credit agreement or any other original documents that the claimant seeks to rely upon, I am aware that the civil procedure rules makes provision for the original documentation to be made available under practice direction 32. It is clear to me that since it is disputed that the documents which the Claimant seeks to rely upon as the alleged “Credit Agreement” the only way to establish truly if they are indeed part of the same document is to produce the original document before the court. In addition, I am aware that there are many regulations and statutory acts which place a duty upon the Claimant to retain original documentation inter alia- the Money Laundering Regulations, the Companies Act 1985 sections 221 and 222 etc. so it stands to reason that they should be able to bring before the court a copy of the original document.

[lilly white]

STOLEN FROM BRW

 

The importance of an Original Copy of the Credit Agreement and its production before the Court

 

59. Under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 there are certain conditions laid down by Parliament which must be complied with if such an Agreement is to be enforced by the Courts (for Agreements pre Consumer Credit Act 2006).

 

60. Firstly, the Agreement must contain certain Prescribed Terms under regulations made by the Secretary of State as outlined in Section 60(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The regulations referred to are the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553).

 

61. The Prescribed Terms are contained in schedule 6 Column 2 of the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) and are as follows:

 

A term stating the credit limit or the manner in which it will be determined or that there is no credit limit, a term stating the rate of any interest on the credit to be provided under the Agreement and a term stating how the Debtor is to discharge his obligations under the Agreement to make the repayments, which may be expressed by reference to a combination of any of the following:

 

Number of repayments;

Amount of repayments;

Frequency and timing of repayments;

Dates of repayments;

The manner in which any of the above may be determined; or in any other way, and any power of the creditor to vary what is payable

 

62. It is submitted that if the Credit Agreement supplied falls foul of the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) in so far that the Prescribed Terms are not contained within the Agreement, then the Court is precluded from enforcing the Agreement. The Prescribed Terms must be within the Agreement for it to be compliant with Section 60(1) Consumer Credit Act 1974. In addition, there is case law from the Court of Appeal which confirms the Prescribed Terms must be contained within the body of the Agreement and not in a separate document.

 

63. I refer to the judgment of TUCKEY LJ in the case of Wilson and another v Hurstanger Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 299"[11] Schedule 1 to the 1983 Regulations sets out the "information to be contained in documents embodying regulated consumer Credit Agreements". Some of this information mirrors the terms prescribed by Schedule 6, but some does not. Contrasting the provisions of the two schedules the Judge said:

 

“33 In my judgment the objective of Schedule 6 is to ensure that, as an inflexible condition of enforceability, certain basic minimum terms are included which the parties (with the benefit of legal advice if necessary) and/or the Court can identify within the four corners of the Agreement. Those minimum provisions combined with the requirement under s61 that all the terms should be in a single document, and backed up by the provisions of s127(3), ensure that these core terms are expressly set out in the Agreement itself: they cannot be orally agreed; they cannot be found in another document; they cannot be implied; and above all they cannot be in the slightest mis- stated. As a matter of policy, the lender is denied any room for manoeuvre in respect of them. On the other hand, they are basic provisions, and the only question for the Court is whether they are, on a true construction, included in the Agreement. More detailed requirements, which are designed to ensure that the Debtor is made aware, so far as possible, of specified information (including information contained in the minimum terms) are to be found in Schedule 1."

 

64. If the Agreement does not contain these terms in the prescribed manner it does not comply with section 60(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, the consequences of which means it is improperly executed and only enforceable by Court order.

 

65. Notwithstanding point 64, The Agreement must be signed in the prescribed manner to comply with Section 61(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. If the Agreement is not signed by Debtor or Creditor, it is also improperly executed and again only enforceable by Court order, although without a Debtor’s Signature, enforcement would not be possible.

 

66. I now wish to make reference to an excerpt of case law from the case of Wilson v Robertsons (London) Ltd [2005] EWHC 1425 (Ch).

 

67. In Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816, [2003] 4 All ER 97, the House of Lords explained that the 1974 Act was, like the Moneylenders Act 1927 before it, designed to tackle a significant social problem. The activities of some moneylenders have given the money lending business a bad reputation. Something had to be done to protect the borrower, who frequently, indeed normally, would be in a weak bargaining position. Protection of borrowers is the social policy behind the legislation. Part of that policy is to be achieved by setting stringent rules, which have to be complied with by the lender if his money lending Agreement is to be enforceable. The strictness of the discipline imposed on lenders is illustrated by the following passage in the speech of Lord Nicholls:

 

"72. Undoubtedly, as illustrated by the facts of the present case, section 127(3) may be drastic, even harsh, in its adverse consequences for a lender. He loses all his right under the Agreement, including his rights to any security which has been lodged. Conversely, the borrower acquires what can only be described as a windfall. He keeps the money and recovers his security. These consequences apply just as much where the lender was acting in good faith throughout and the error was due to a mistaken reading of the complex statutory requirements as in the case of deliberate non- compliance. These consequences also apply where, as in the present case, the borrower suffered no prejudice as a result of the non-compliance as they do where the borrower was misled. Parliament was painting here with a broad brush.

 

73. The unattractive feature of this approach is that it will sometimes involve punishing the blameless pour encourager les autres. On its face, considered in the context of one particular case, a sanction having this effect is difficult to justify. The Moneylenders Act 1927 adopted a similarly severe approach…

 

74. Despite [criticism in the Crowther report] I have no difficulty in accepting that in suitable instances it is open to Parliament, when Parliament considers the public interest so requires, deciding that failure to comply with certain formalities is an essential prerequisite to enforcement of certain types of Agreements. This course is open to Parliament even though this will sometimes yield a seemingly unreasonable result in a particular case. Considered overall, this course may well be a proportionate response in practice to a perceived social problem. Parliament may consider the response should be a uniform solution across the board. A tailor-made response, fitting the facts of each case as decided in an application to the Court, may not be appropriate. This may be considered an insufficient incentive and insufficient deterrent. And it may fail to protect consumers adequately…"

 

68. The message from the case of Wilson v Robertsons (London) Ltd [2005] EWHC 1425 (Ch), is that the Consumer Credit Act is clearly enacted to protect consumers such as myself and therefore the Claimant’s failures to supply the information and their general behaviour in this matter should be noted accordingly, giving consideration to the case law and the facts as set out within this Defence.

 

69. Therefore, the Claimant must provide an original copy of the Agreement compliant with the regulations as laid out in points 59 to 69 of this Defence to have any right of enforcement. This is the Document that I requested many times, all to no avail.

 

 

The Court’s Power of Enforcement

 

70. The Court’s powers of enforcement where Agreements are improperly executed by way of Section 65 are themselves subject to certain qualifying factors. Under Section 127(3) Consumer Credit Act 1974 the requirements are laid out clearly what is required for the Court to be able to enforce the Agreement where Section 65(1) has not been complied with. Section 127(3) The Court shall not make an enforcement order under section 65(1) if section 61(1)(a) (signing of Agreements) was not complied with unless a document (whether or not in the prescribed form and complying with regulations under section 60(1) itself containing all the Prescribed Terms of the Agreement was signed by the Debtor or hirer (whether or not in the prescribed manner).

 

71. Furthermore the Courts attention is also drawn to the authority of the House of Lords in Wilson-v- FCT [2003] All ER (D) 187 (Jul) which confirms that where a document does not contain the required terms under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) and Consumer Credit (Agreements) (Amendment) Regulations 2004 (SI2004/1482) the Agreement cannot be enforced.

 

72. With regards to the Authority cited in point 16, I refer to LORD NICHOLLS OF BIRKENHEAD in the House of Lords Wilson v First County Trust Ltd - [2003] All ER (D) 187 (Jul):

 

“28. I should outline the salient provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Subject to exemptions, a regulated Agreement is an Agreement between an individual Debtor and another person by which the latter provides the former with a cash loan or other financial accommodation not exceeding a specified amount. Currently the amount is £25,000. Section 61(1) sets out conditions which must be satisfied if a regulated Agreement is to be treated as properly executed. One of these conditions, in paragraph (a), is that the Agreement must be in a prescribed form containing all the Prescribed Terms. The Prescribed Terms are the amount of the credit or the credit limit, rate of interest (in some cases), how the borrower is to discharge his obligations, and any power the creditor may have to vary what is payable: Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983, Schedule 6. The consequence of improper execution is that the Agreement is not enforceable against the Debtor save by an order of the Court: Section 65(1). Section 127(1) provides what is to happen on an application for an enforcement order under Section 65. The Court 'shall dismiss' the application if, but only if, the Court considers it just to do so having regard to the prejudice caused to any person by the contravention in question and the degree of culpability for it. The Court may reduce the amount payable by the Debtor so as to compensate him for prejudice suffered as a result of the contravention, or impose conditions, or suspend the operation of any term of the order or make consequential changes in the Agreement or security.

 

29. The Court's powers under Section 127(1) are subject to significant qualification in two types of cases. The first type is where section 61(1)(a), regarding signing of Agreements, is not complied with. In such cases the Court 'shall not make' an enforcement order unless a document, whether or not in the prescribed form, containing all the Prescribed Terms, was signed by the Debtor: section 127(3). Thus, signature of a document containing all the Prescribed Terms is an essential prerequisite to the Court's power to make an enforcement order. The second type of case concerns failure to comply with the duty to supply a copy of an executed or unexecuted Agreement pursuant to Sections 62 and 63, or failure to comply with the duty to give notice of Cancellation rights in accordance with section 64(1). Here again, subject to one exception regarding Sections 62 and 63, Section 127(4) precludes the Court from making an enforcement order.

 

30. These restrictions on enforcement of a Regulated Agreement cannot be sidestepped... In the present case the essence of the complaint is that section 127(3) of the Consumer Credit Act has the effect that a Regulated Agreement is not enforceable unless a document containing all the Prescribed Terms is signed by the Debtor.

 

49. ".............The message to be gleaned from sections 65, 106, 113 and 127 of the Consumer Credit Act is that where a Court dismisses an application for an enforcement order under section 65 the lender is intended by Parliament to be left without recourse against the borrower in respect of the loan. That being the consequence intended by Parliament, the lender cannot assert at common law that the borrower has been unjustly enriched.

 

50. This interpretation of the Consumer Credit Act accords with the approach adopted by the House in Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95, regarding section 6 of the Moneylenders Act 1927 and, more recently, in Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384, another case where section 127(3) precluded the making of an enforcement order. In Dimond's case the restitutionary remedy sought was payment of the hire charge for a replacement car used by Mrs Dimond. The House rejected a claim advanced on the basis of unjust enrichment. Lord Hoffmann observed that Parliament contemplated that a Debtor might be enriched consequential upon non-enforcement of an Agreement pursuant to the statutory provisions. It was not open to the Court to say this consequence is unjust and should be reversed by a remedy at common law: [2002] 1 AC 384, 397-398.

 

73. The judgment of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead clearly sets out that without a Credit Agreement the Claimant's case cannot succeed.

 

74. I therefore respectfully request that the Court order the Claimant produce the Original signed Agreement before the Court to show the form and content of it and that it complies with the Regulations referred to in this Defence, otherwise the Court’s powers of enforcement are surely limited in these circumstances.

 

75. Furthermore, the Defendant requires clarification on the status of the original Agreement, if such ever existed. If the document is no longer in existence the Defendant requires certification of destruction and furthermore the Defendant will call into question the validity of any purported copy of the said contract where the original has been destroyed. The Defendant will require production of details as to when any copy was made and what medium the copy has been stored on along with clarification of who has had access to the document. I will also require written clarification that any copy document produced is authentic. Suitable Document checking, copying and destruction Policy notes must also be provided, backed up by Audit Logs to confirm how such Policies were carried out, checked and maintained. The Defendant notes that the Civil Procedure Rules also require the original documents to be made available under Practice Direction 32.

 

76. I also refer to the following quotation obtained from the Website of Francis Bennion, who was the draftsman of the Consumer Credit Act 1974:

 

Consumer Credit Act 1974 s 127(3):

 

"As the draftsman of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 I would like to thank Dr Richard Lawson for his interesting and well-argued article (30 August 2003) on Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 4 All ER 97. Dr Lawson may be interested to know that I included the provision in question (section 127(3)) entirely on my own initiative. It seemed right to me that if the creditor company couldn't be bothered to ensure that all the prescribed particulars were accurately included in the Credit Agreement it deserved to find it unenforceable, and that the Court should not have power to relieve it from this penalty. Nobody queried this, and it went through Parliament without debate. I'm glad the House of Lords has now vindicated my reasoning and confirmed that nobody's human rights were infringed.

 

167 Justice of the Peace (2003) 773.

 

77. The Defendant is under the belief that in the case of Rankine v Barclays Bank Plc [2005] on appeal from Stafford County Court the issue of the loss of the original, or destruction of the original Credit Agreement was central to the case and the Defendant is under the belief that the outcome of the case was that where the original Agreement could not be produced the claim could not succeed and that the appeal was successful.

 

78. I would also like to draw the Court’s attention to the requirements of CPR Practice Direction 16 7.3, which states:

 

7.3 Where a claim is based upon a written Agreement:

 

(1) a copy of the contract or documents constituting the Agreement should be attached to or served with the particulars of claim and the original(s) should be available at the hearing

 

79. Should the Claimant be unable to produce the original Agreement signed by both Debtor and Creditor and containing the Prescribed Terms, I request that the Court uses its powers under Section 142 Consumer Credit Act 1974 and declare the Agreement as unenforceable.

138. Furthermore, it has since come to my attention that the above Cancellable Loan Agreement was itself invalid and wholly unenforceable, owing to a major failure by the Claimant to issue an Executed Copy and Cancellation Rights Notice within the Seven Day time limit, as they were required to do by virtue of Section 63(3) and Section 64(1b) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.

 

139. The cancellable Agreement concerned was executed upon my Signature, as it was pre-signed by the Creditor. Thus the Section 64 Seven Day time limit for sending out a Cancellation Notice started the moment I put pen to paper and Signed/Dated the Agreement. The Claimant could've avoided this by not pre-signing it. However, they were in such a headlong rush to mis-sell the highly profitable PPI, their Loan Agreement came out to me not just pre-Signed, but pre-Printed with a facsimile Signature and Date.

 

140. Cancellation Rights did not appear to concern the Claimant. Had they sent out an un-signed Agreement for me to Sign first, then it would only have been Executed upon their own Signature on return from me. That simple step would've afforded them at least the full Seven Days to play with in order to post the required Cancellation Rights Notice. Furthermore, the Seven Days would only have started from the Day they had Signed to Execute the Agreement. By pre-Signing the Agreement, they immediately reduced any time available to send out a Cancellation Notice to significantly less than Seven Days, i.e. allowing for Postage from me to them, and then any Cancellation Notice from them to me. However, it is clear that no attempt was even made to send out a Cancellation Notice, as confirmed by their Loan Confirmation letter that followed shortly after the Executed Agreement was received by them. This Letter made absolutely no mention of any Cancellation Notice, confirming that none had been sent out within the required Seven Days.

 

141. The Agreement was therefore not properly executed by virtue of Section 63(5), and so could not be Enforced by virtue of Section 127(4a) and Section 127(4b), as they failed to comply with Section 63(3) and failed to comply with Section 64(1b).

 

Plan-A: labour the point about s127(3) in the event that they cannot produce an Original Agreement that contains the Prescribed Terms. If they cannot prove there was an Agreement, then the rest of their case falls apart.

 

Plan-B: if they do produce an Original with Prescribed Terms, or the Judge (incorrectly in my view) accepts that the two apparently unrelated Copies are part of the same Agreement, then I stress the invalid Default Notice issues, and their s78(6) restraint, and their failure to comply with s87/s88 denying them any of the benefits of s87.

 

Plan-C: hit the rival Barrister with a chair, rip my shirt off to reveal a CAG Superman T-Shirt and Cape, and leap out of the nearest window...oops, sorry x20, that's meant to be secret!

[kel123]

Todays order (the ink is still wet)

 

1.Summary Judgement be entered for the claiment on the following issues

(a) The credit agreement between the parties was signed by a duly authorised officer of the claiment on 28.02.05 and accordingly the agreement was properly executed under section 61 of the consumer credit act 1974

(b) By provision of the documents exhibited as PCJ1 and PCJ8, the claiment has provided a true copy of the credit agreement in compliance with the request made by the defendant under section 78 of the act

 

2. The defence be struck out

 

3. The deefendant shall file and serve any amended defence and/or counter claim by 4pm on 18.11.09

 

4. The parties shall exchange witness statements of witneses of fact exhibiting any documents which are relied upon by 4pm on 30.12.09

 

5. Pre-trial checklist/listing questionaires shall be sent to the parties by the court by 13.01.10 and shall be returned completed to the court by 20.01.10

 

6. The trial of this case will take place durring the period comencing 8/3/10 and ending 3/4/10, at a venue to be notified with a provisional time estimate of 4 hours

 

7. Claiments costs of the application to be summary arranged at the next hearing of this matter

 

District judge *******

-4 NOV 2009

(curvey line signature over top)

[kel123]

OK some basics

 

The account was signed in branch

 

I was advised to take out PPI (I was a self employed sole trader) to cover the payments should my busines fail

 

My business failed and was in the process of coming off self employment so I applied on the PPI. I was told that because I was self employed when I took the PPI out, that I could not claim.

 

Lloyds knew I was self employed because they had my business account. The application had to be accepted by my business manager, who was spocken to over the phone durring the application process.

 

I am on a DMP and as I understand it payplan arrange payments in advance and the payment date is arround the 15th of the month (I do need to confirm this with them)

 

Default notice

 

87(i) on the Poc

Incorrect arrears says two months not one

No where on the notice does it say termination or early payment if not remadied

 

I saw these as minor

[kel123]

To continue the set, I will post the DN when possible

 

This is my witness statement that the judge admitted reading but didn't allow it to be introduced:

 

Witness Statement

And

Statement of Truth/Fact

By

Kel123

Defendant in this Case

Of

xxxx

xxx

 

Dated 21st September 2009

In the ****** County Court

Lloyds TSB Bank Plc v Mr Kel123

Claim Number XXXXXXXXX

 

　

I am a litigant in person and everything within the statement as been researched by myself and is therefore within my own personal knowledge. All documents referenced by me were either written by me, sent to me or are within the public domain.

1. Introduction/Background

1.1 Early 2005 my business venture unfortunately failed and left us, as a family with around 48K of personal debt. Not all of this debt was due to the failure. We had 9 accounts with 4 different creditors, we informed all of our creditors of the situation and they responded by freezing or reducing the interest rates. We struggled to maintain the payments, missing many during this period by having to ‘rob Peter to pay Paul’. Finally in early 2006 we contacted The National Debt Line, they tried to help but quickly introduced us to Payplan a free financial sector funded debt management company. We again made sure all of our creditors were aware of the situation, only this time their reactions were different, all started applying interest and charges, some even back dating them. When we officially started our debt management plan in September 2006 our debt had risen by around 8K making our debt now in the region of 56K

 

1.2 I felt this increase to be completely unfair. After a lengthy investigation in February 2008 I send a letter (defence exhibit 13) to all our creditors (9 different letters covering all our accounts). 4 Letters were sent to Lloyds TSB Bank Plc because we had 4 different accounts. Of the 9 accounts only 4 complied with legislation? Of the 4 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc accounts it was an even split. All 9 accounts were initially included in our Debt Management Plan.

 

1.3 With regards to this Lloyds TSB Bank Plc account, account number 5XXXXXXXXXX, it was not until I received the third ‘We are still investigating letter’ (defence exhibits 9, 10 & 11) and the statement on their leaflet, voicing your concerns (defence exhibit 12) that I stopped paying into the account. The 2 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc accounts that complied with legislation are continuing to be paid through our Debt Management Plan.

 

2. Information Request

2.1 On the 29th February I sent a recorded delivery letter (defence exhibit 13) to Lloyds TSB Bank requesting a copy of the original signed Consumer Credit Agreement and Terms and Conditions for account number XXXXXXXXXX. It was signed for on the 3rd March 2008. Enclosed was the maximum statutory charge of £1 which was cashed 4th April 2008 approximately one month latter. Within this letter I reminded Lloyds TSB that they had 12 days in which to respond (Consumer Credit Act 1974 [plus revisions] S77/78)

2.2 On the 26th March 2008 I sent a recorded delivery letter (defence exhibit 14) to Lloyds TSB Bank Plc advising them that the account was now in dispute for not supplying the requested information within statutory time Scales (ref 2.1). Within this letter I advised Lloyds TSB Bank Plc that by their none compliance with my letter of the 29th February 2008 there are now limitation as laid by the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The letter was signed for on the 28th March 2008.

 

2.3 On the 21st April 2008 I sent a recorded delivery letter (defence exhibit 16) to Lloyds TSB Bank Plc advising them that they had committed an offence under S77/78 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The letter was signed for on the 24th April 2008.

 

2.4 Since the 19th April 2008 (12 days + 1 calendar month) Lloyds TSB Bank Plc have: continued to request payment (defence exhibits 2 & 6), registered defaults with Reference Agencies (defence exhibit 7), passed on my details to Debt Collection Agencies (defence exhibits 7, 17 & 18), issued a Default Notice (defence exhibit 8a & 8b) and sort to enforce the claim through the courts.

 

(The Default Notice and why the account remained in dispute is discussed later)

Subject Access Request

 

3.1 On the 29th February I sent a recorded delivery letter (defence exhibit 13) to Lloyds TSB Bank with a Subject Access Request, for which I included the statutory charge of £10 which was cashed the 4th April 2008. The letter was signed for on the 3rd March 2008

4 Consumer Credit Agreement

 

4.1 On the 9th April 2008 I received an application form through the post. There was no covering letter. (defence exhibit 25a)

4.2 On the 10th April 2008 I sent a recorded delivery letter (defence exhibit 15) to Lloyds TSB Bank Plc, pointing out that they had sent an application form and therefore had not met the requirement of my letter of the 29th February 2008 (ref 2.1)

(Issues with the credit agreement are below)

 

4.2.1 There is no Lloyds TSB Bank Plc signature.

In section 5 (defence exhibit 25a) it says: "…….If your application is accepted by our signature and we send you a card, then this will form the agreement…….."

Within the Consumer Credit Act 1974 S61 –

(1) A regulated agreement is not properly executed unless-

(a) a document in the prescribed form itself containing all the prescribed terms and conforming to regulations under 60(1) is signed in the prescribed manor both by the debtor or hirer and by or on behalf of the creditor or owner, and

(b) the document embodies all the terms of the agreement, other than implied terms, and

© the document is, when presented or sent to the debtor or hirer for signature, in such a state that all it’s terms are readily legible.

Because the content of S127 (3) was not retrospectively deleted when the amendments came part of legislation on the 6th April 2007, a court cannot make a ruling if S61 and S65 have not been complied with.

There is an indication of a ‘squiggle’ in the date box. It is my understanding that it is currently accepted that a signature must contain 3 facets:

Intent

Purpose

Traceability

A published article by Professor Chris Reed Head of the Information Technology Law Unit Queen Mary & Westfield College, London in the Journal of Information, Law and Technology on the 31st October 2000, discusses this, ref 3.1.1 Cases, it also includes case references.

 

4.2.2 It as been admitted by the claimant that the original Credit application/Agreement as been destroyed (defence exhibit 1) (practise Directions 32.13 (1) Photocopies instead of original documents may be exhibited provided the originals are made available for inspection by the other parties before the hearing and by the judge at the hearing. And CPR part 16.7.3 (1) Where a claim is based upon a written agreement, a copy of the contract or documents constituting the agreement should be attached to or served with the particulars of claim and the original(s) should be available at the hearing.) It is at the courts discretion (S8.1 Civil Evidence Act 1995) to admit copy evidence where the original has been destroyed, If such a decision is made I request that full hearsay evidence rules apply (S2 Notice of proposal to adduce hearsay evidence, of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 together with proof of the authenticity of the documents as required.

4.2.3 The quality of the copy of the credit agreement ranges from poor to unreadable (Consumer Credit (Cancellation Notices and copy documents) Regulations 1983 2(1) The lettering in every notice in a form prescribed by these Regulations and in every copy of an executed agreement, security instrument or other document referred to in the act and delivered or sent to a debtor, hirer or surety under any provision of the act shall, apart from any signature, be easily legible and of a colour which is readily distinguishable from the)

4.2.4 Within the particulars of claim reference is made to clauses 5, 6, 7 and 9. Within the Terms and Conditions supplied to me and the court, there are no clauses 5, 6, 7 and 9 therefore it is not even a copy of the original credit agreement. Therefore I refer to 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.

4.2.5 The Terms and condition supplied to me and the court contains ink smudges, which is reflective of a printed sheet which has been photocopied too quickly, not allowing the ink to be dried. Also it is not the same size as the front sheet and does not contain any reference marks. Therefore it is not even a copy of the original credit agreement. Therefore I refer to 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.

5. Complaints Procedure

 

5.1 Following my letters to Lloyds TSB Bank Plc (ref 2.1, 2.2 & 4.2). Lloyds TSB Bank sent the first of 3 letters (dated Saturday 19th April 2008), ref CSRC-Brighton/80148 (Defence Exhibit 9), saying that they are investigating

 

5.2 With the letter in 5.1.1. I also received a leaflet entitled Voicing Your Concerns (Defence Exhibit 12) Within the final paragraph titled ‘Our Promise’ it says: "When we write to you with our final response…….."

5.3 20 days later I received a second letter dated 9th May 2008 (Defence Exhibit 10) in which it says that they are still investigating.

 

5.4 25 days later I received a third letter dated 4th June 2008 (Defence Exhibit 11) in which it says that we are still investigating

 

5.5 With ref to5.2 & 2.1.2. I have never received a final response and because of this and the time scales I was not entitled to contact the Financial Ombudsman Service. Therefore this account continued to be in dispute.

 

6. Default Notice (Defence Exhibit 8a & 8b)

6.1 With ref to 5.5. Under The Consumer Credit Act 1974 S78 6(a) he is not entitled, while the default continues, to enforce the agreement. With ref to 2.4 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc acted with due disregard for legislation.

 

6.2 The Default Notice itself does not comply with the Consumer Credit (Enforcement, Default and Termination Notices) Regulations 1983 S4 A clear and unambiguous statement by the creditor or owner indicating--

(a) which (one or more) of the following types of action he intends to take, in order to enforce the term of the agreement,--

(i) to demand earlier payment of any sum

 

6.2.1 Within the paragraph headed ‘What will we do if you do not correct the breach?’ It says ‘We will refer your account to our solicitors and claim what you owe us through the courts.’

 

6.2.2 There is no reference to early payment anywhere on this Default Notice, 6.2.1 is clearly ambiguous and as a result, all that is owed by this statement is what money is due at the time of writing.

 

6.3 Having now terminated the agreement another Default Notice cannot be issued because how can you default what doesn’t exist. Also failure of a Default Notice and subsequent Termination to be accurate not only invalidates such Notice (Woodchester Lease Management Services Ltd v Swain & Co NLD 14 July 1998) but is an unlawful rescission of contract which would not only prevent the court enforcing any alleged debt (Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 147) but would also give the claimant a claim for damages in the sum of £1000 (Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All ER 119)

6.3 The figures are incorrect: Payplan pay into the accounts the middle of each month organising it so it is paid in advance for that particular month. June 2008 under my instructions had not been paid (due end of June), The default notice was issued the 22nd July 2008 therefore Julys payment was not due and therefore the arrears should have read £20.12 not £40.24.

 

7. Particular of Claim

7.1 PoC 2 with reference to 4.2.4

7.2 PoC 3 reference is made to the Consumer Credit Act 1974. "…….Claimant issued a Default Notice pursuant to section 87(i)…." There is no Section 87(i) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 or revisions?

May I finish by bringing to the attention of the court some of the ‘Antics’ of Sechiari Clark and Mitchell acting on behalf of Lloyds TSB Bank Plc. They have refused to follow CPR and Practice Directions justifying it by saying ‘Our client will await the courts direction’ (Defence Exhibit 7a) and implying that a judgment order has been made and to avoid further costs here is how you pay (Defence Exhibit 5a & 5b) and also their second attempt to gain summery judgment, given that it was requested close to the trail date (as per judges orders of the 9th July 2009 based upon the draft orders as submitted by Sechiari Clark & Mitchell 11th May 2009).

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true

　

　

Kel123

[kel123]

Here is my submitted defence against the Summary Judgement application, again the judge admitted reading it but would not allow it to be introduced.

 

 

Defence Statement

By

Kel123

Defendant in this Case

Of

XXX

XXX

 

Dated 21st September 2009

In the ****** County Court

Lloyds TSB Bank Plc v Mr Ke123

Claim Number XXXXXXX

 

 

Hearing for Summery Judgment 4th November 2009

 

　

　

　

1. This defence is in conjunction with The defendants witness statement of the 21st September 2009 (any reference to this witness statement will have the prefix KLHWS)

1.1 The defendant stand by his witness statement of the 21st September 2009 and it is part of his defence.

2. The defendant would prefer this case to go to trial.

2.1 This is the second time an application for Summery Judgement has been made (Ref KLHWS 7.2) the first via Northampton County Court. The defendant sees this attempt as either a delaying tactic because they are not ready for trial or an attempt to get the court to ‘throw out’ the case therefore avoiding the need to discontinue.

3. Although the Claim Number is correct on the application Notice the claimants ref number is unrecognisable and would therefore question the reliability of the witness Philip Clay-Joyce.

3.1 Further more he claims that this is a true copy (Ref PCJ2) but according to the Terms and Conditions (headed Banks copy Ref PCJ2) and with reference to the Particulars of Claim it is not a true copy (Ref KLHWS 7.1) therefore further questioning the reliability of Philip Clay-Joyce

3.2 Further to 3.1 within the witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 3. it says "A copy of the front and reverse…." It has already been established that this is the Banks copy (ref 3.1) and is further discussed ref KLHWS 4.2.4 & 4.2.5.

3.3 Further to 3.2 within the witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 3. it says "….the acceptance form that upon Signature on behalf of the bank…." is discussed ref KLHWS 4.2.1.

4. Within the witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 4. there is a mixture of knowledge and hearsay. This does not comply with The Civil Evidence Act 1995 S1, Philip Clay-Joyce has not produced evidence of the system nor system audits and has not explained why the original was destroyed

4.1 Further to 4. No notification has been given to adduce hearsay (Civil Evidence Act 1995 S2) (ref KLHWS 4.2.2)

5. Witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 5. This is discussed at length ref KLHWS 4.1 to 4.5

6. Witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 6. This is a clear attempt to mislead the court by making a ruling that only the court is allowed to make. S8(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 final line says "authenticated in such manner as the court may approve" With reference to KLHWS 4.2.2

6.1 Further to 6. Although the defendant recognises the use of S8 and S9 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995, he understands that this is general guidance, but for a more specific guidance CPR part 16.7.3 (1) Where a claim is based upon a written agreement, should be relied on, and as such the original should be available in court. With reference to KLHWS 4.2.4

6.2 Witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 6. Again reference is made to "….is a true copy document…." Please see 3.1 & 3.2 above.

6.3 Witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 6. It says "…..Exhibit PCJ2 is a signed certificate." But not dated? The defendant with reference to the above questions the reliability of the witness therefore the credence of this certificate.

7. Witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 7. The defendant is defending this case on whether the claimant has the rights to collect on this account with reference to his witness statement of the 21st September 2009.

7.1 Witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 7. It may interest the court that the sum of £5,710.92 contains the following £80.00 (account Charges), £797.65 (interest) and £388.30 (Payment Protection which he could not use because of being self employed)

8. Witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 8. The defendant has attempted to correlate the supplied Terms and Condition (PCJ1), The Particulars of Claim and changes to your Credit Card Conditions (PCJ4) but unfortunately he cannot find the formulae. Please reference KLHWS 4.2.4, 4.2.5 & 7.1.

9. Witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 9. Ref KLHWS 1. to1.3

10. Witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 10. Ref KLHWS 1. to 1.3. Because the statement for May 2008 is missing from PCJ3 the last payment has been mistakenly accepted as April 2008 when in fact the last payment was May 2008.

11. Witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 11. Ref KLHWS 1. to 1.3

12. Witness statement of Philip Clay-Joyce point 12. The stated amount of Arrears is incorrect, it should be £20.12 not £40.24 (ref KLHWS 6.3)

12.1 Further to 12. Why the Default Notice is invalid is discussed Ref KLHWS 6.1 to 6.3

13. Given the content of this defence and the defendants witness statement which have highlighted many errors/deficiencies in many areas of the claimants case, the defendant requests that the court use it’s powers to set aside this application for Summery Judgment and proceed to trial.

I believe that the facts stated in this defence statement are true

　

　

Kel123

[kel123]

This is my skeleton arguement I went armed with this morning. I was only allowed to use areas 1) & 2) and not distribute

 

Your honour

There are 5 areas where I am contesting this claim

1.None compliance with a Section 78 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 request

2.Improper execution of the Credit Agreement

3.None compliance of the Consumer Credit (Enforcement, Default and Termination Notices) Regulations 1983

4.The Particulars of Claim are inaccurate

5.Miss sold Payment Protection

None compliance with a Section 78 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 request

78 – (1) The creditor under a regulated agreement for running account credit, within the prescribed period after receiving a request in writing to that effect from the debtor and a payment fee of £1 shall give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement (if any) and of any other document referred to in it, together with a statement signed by or on behalf of the creditor showing, according to the information to which it is practical for him to refer, -

(a) the state of the account

(b) the amount, if any currently payable under the agreement by the debtor to the creditor and

© the amounts and due dates of any payments which, if the debtor does not draw further on the account, will later become payable under the agreement by the debtor to the creditor.

(2) If the creditor possesses insufficient information to enable him to ascertain the amounts and dates mentioned in subsection (1)©, he shall be taken to comply with that paragraph if his statement under section (1) gives the basis on which, under the regulated agreement, they would fall to be ascertained.

(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to –

(a) an agreement under which no sum is, or will or may become, payable by the debtor, or

(b) a request made less than 1 month after a previous request under that subsection relating to the same agreement was complied with.

(4) where running-account credit is provided under a regulated agreement, the creditor shall give the debtor statements in the prescribed form, and with the prescribed contents –

(a) showing according to the information to which it is practicable for him to refer, the state of the account at regular intervals of not more than 12 months, and

(b) where the agreement provides, in relation to specific periods, for the making of payments by the debtor, or the charging against him of interest or any other sum, showing according to the information to which it is practicable for him to refer the state of the account at the end of each of those periods during which there is any movement in the account.

(4A) Regulations may require a statement under subsection (4) to contain also information in the prescribed terms about the consequences of the debtor –

(a) failing to make payments as required by the agreement; and

(b) only making payments of a prescribed description in prescribed circumstances.

(5) A statement under subsection (4) shall be given within the prescribed period after the end of the period to which the statement relates.

(6) If the creditor under an agreement fails to comply with section (1) –

(a) he is not entitled, while the default continues, to enforce the agreement.

(7) This section does not apply to a non-commercial agreement, and subsections (4) to (5) do not apply to small agreement.

　

Lloyds TSB Bank Plc have not complied with subsection (1), they have supplied an application form or at most an improperly executed agreement. A ‘terms and conditions’ headed bank copy and subsequently a freshly typed terms and condition purportedly a true copy. And have never complied with subsections (1)(a), (1)(b) or (1)©.

The terms and condition headed bank copy and the freshly terms and condition subsequently supplied contain no reference to either each other or to the application form. And there is no page numbering or page reference, that links this freshly produced terms and conditions together.

 

Furthermore I refer to the judgement of Tuckey LJ in the case of Wilson and another v Hurstanger Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 299.

 

"33. In my judgement the objective of schedule 6 is to ensure that, as an inflexible condition of enforceability, curtain basic minimum terms are included which the parties (with the benefit of legal advice if necessary) and/or the court can identify within the four corners of the agreement.

 

It goes onto say:

 

Those minimum provisions combined with the requirement under s61 that all the terms should be in a single document, and backed up by the provision of s127(3), ensure that these terms are expressly set out in the agreement itself: They cannot be orally agreed; they cannot be found in another document; they cannot be implied; and above all they cannot be in the slightest miss-stated.

 

And then

 

As a matter of policy, the lender is denied any room for manoeuvre in respect of them. On the other hand, they are basic provisions, and the only question for the court is whether they are, on a true construction, included in the agreement.

　

Therefore not only subsection (6)(a), comes into play ‘he is not entitled, while the default continues, to enforce the agreement. Making it redeemable unenforceable but also Section 127(3) making the it irredeemable unenforceable.

 

Other

SC&M know this yet are still pursuing

Spelling discrepancies between Terms and Conditions

Unreadable (Consumer Credit (Cancellation Notices and copy documents) Regulations 1983

 

Improper execution of the Credit Agreement

 

Refer to witness statement Section 4

 

None compliance of the Consumer Credit (Enforcement, Default and Termination Notices) Regulations 1983

 

Refer to witness statement section 6

 

The Particulars of Claim are inaccurate

 

Refer to witness statement Section 7

 

Miss sold Payment Protection

 

From the application form and from bank statements I was sold Payment Protection insurance. I was not told that it was not relevant for a self employed person and that as a self employed person I could not claim this. I did attempt to claim but I was informed that because I was self employed when I took it out and that I was still self employed I could not claim. Lloyds TSB Bank Plc knew I was self employed because:-

Lloyds TSB Bank Plc held my Business Account, and

My Business Manager needed to OK my application (which he did so during the completion of the application form at the bank)

 

Other

Multiple agreement

　

　

Request to judge that the Summery Judgment be dismissed and the he use his powers to strike out the case on the grounds that SC&M representing Lloyds TSB Bank Plc have no realistic chance of winning the claim.