Here is some wording for you to tweak: Contrary to assertions made by X in a letter dated X, X has still failed to comply with its obligations under section 78 of the Consumer Credit Act. It is indeed correct that a set of documents was sent to me under cover of a letter dated X from X. However, X did not thereby comply with its obligations under section 78 of the 1974 Act. Regulation 3(1) of the Consumer Credit (Cancellation Notices and Copies of Documents) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1557) requires the provision of a true copy of an agreement. Although this need not be an exact copy and certain information may be omitted from a true copy, it must still be a true copy rather than a conjectured reconstruction and the information that may be omitted is strictly specified. However, it is not the case that information need only be provided in relation to an agreement as varied or that only the most recent version of the terms and conditions applicable to an agreement need be provided. Seeking to rely on regulation 7 in supporting that position is to overlooks both the distinctions between the wording regulation 7 on one hand and regulations 8 and 9 on the other. Although regulations 8 and 9 use the word "comprise", regulation 7 uses the word "include". It provides that copies provided in accordance with any section other than section 85 shall include either an easily legible copy of the latest notice of variation or an easily legible statement of the terms of the agreement as varied. X would only have been entitled to provide a statement of the current terms of the agreement in lieu of a true copy of the executed agreement in the very limited circumstances in which regulation 9 applies (ie to agreements entered into prior to 1985). Neither regulation 8 nor 9 applies in this instance, so the information provided must include the current terms and conditions and not merely comprise the current terms and conditions. Accordingly, X was (and is still) obliged to provide a true copy of the terms and conditions referred to in the application form in their original form, in addition to the current terms and conditions that have been provided. I would be obliged if these could now be provided without further delay or prevarication. In the meantime, the effect of section 78(6) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 is that X is precluded from taking any enforcement action whatsoever in relation to the account.

Had a think about this and we need to be a bit savvy. Making a counter offer normally supersedes the original offer - although I can't remember if that applies to Calderbank offer (the nickname for offers made without prejudice save as to costs, which is a bit of a mouthful). However, it is not worth getting into a situation where it even becomes arguable. So, what is needed (I think) is a Without Prejudice letter along the following lines: Your costs were entirely reasonable (and, if anything, on the low side) but you will consider the offer in the interests of finality (closure, if you want to be touchy-feely). However, it would be so much better for both sides if there was complete finality. They would require permission from the court to commence another set of proceedings. They would be breaking the OFT Debt Collection Guidelines and the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations if they pursued the matter any other way. You would have no hesitation in accepting an offer of 2/3 of your costs if it were accompanied by a suitable assurance that the matter was entirely concluded but, in the absence of such an assurance, you will need to think about it. If that doesn't work, you should still have the option of accepting their offer or you can take a chance and make your own Calderbank offer. Before I turn that into a letter, what do others think of the plan?

The ironic thing is that, if the straws in the wind are to be believed, the wake will not be held on CAG but at Pride Park.

He meant the particulars of claim. Can you type them out word for word (apart from any account number and the exact amount of money)?

I don't think that there is a standard Witness Statement because there is no such thing as a standard case. The ones CB posted links to should still be useful because they will show the format to be followed. I think that the Witness Statement for a final hearing rather than an application should be restricted to the facts rather than the law - the law would go into a skeleton argument. However, this is a time for playing the LIP card and going for broke. Set out your version of what happened and when and why it matters.

I'll be interested in what you come up with on this but I have to say that it looked less promising when I crunched the permutations of what are and are not trade premises in the scenarios I came up with.

Something that emerged from the Egg thread was that there seemed to be genuine confusion as to how the approved and individual limits ever worked, not merely well-coached confusion. For several years, Egg managed to use three different terms: limit, approved limit and individual limit. All used the word "limit" but none of them using the word "credit". Two of the terms (approved limit and individual limit) were used to define the third term (limit) but they themselves were defined in a separate document. There is no clue on the face of the document as to what the limit relates to. Without referring to a separate document, it is a matter of guesswork, which is exactly what the policy of the Act was to avoid. To paraphrase Soap: confused, you probably were. This is more than just a typo or a mis-spelling. The point of the legislation was to ensure that the most important, basic, fundamental terms of the agreement were on the face of the document - for pre-2005 Egg agreements, they were not. I would not advocate stopping your direct debit on a whim but, let's face it, most people do not embark on this process on a whim. As for the balance of justice, there was a very simple way of Egg ensuring that their agreements would be enforceable, they could always have used the same words as the ones used in the legislation.

And I think a bloke from the Midlands (can't remember his name off-hand) wrote a really cool story once in which a moneylender tried to stand on his rights and lost the lot and that wasn't last week either.

I thought not and it is not the main plank by any means but I thought it worth exploring. Thanks!

Did the signed application form actually contain all of the prescribed terms? That is the important question. And a double sided photocopy is not necessarily a photocopy of a double sided document.

Thanks for the pointer. Any thoughts on the premises issues, PT? PS It's not just academic interest, because it is relevant to a spat Mrs VS has with MBNA. But if it has wider interest for others, even better.

If the agreement says it is cancellable, even if it wouldn't have been otherwise, doesn't that make it cancellable anyway? I should know this by now but can't remember what conclusion was reached the last time this came up.

Whilst I'm not for one minute suggesting it was why it was being done this time, it occurs to me that an unscrupulous DCA (though in best HIGNFY traditions, such people only exist allegedly) could farm e-mail addresses of unsuspecting CAGgers (not that there should be any such person) for the purposes of harassment. So, another good reason not to be unsuspecting.

I had forgotten about section 49 when the discussion about cancellation rights prompted my musings about premises. I have had a look at section 49 and I can see that an offence is committed but I need to make the jump from that to the agreement being void. I also had a look at the definition in section 48 and I would be worried by the exception in s48(2): A place is excluded from subsection (1) if it is a place where a business is carried on (whether on a permanent or temporary basis) by— (a) the creditor or owner, or (b) a supplier, or © the canvasser, or the person whose employee or agent the canvasser is, or (d) the consumer. Taking my three examples in turn: I think the fair/show/exhibition is almost certainly a place where the canvasser's employer is carrying on a business temporarily. I don't think that the club is either a creditor or a supplier for the purposes of its branded card but I wonder whether the ground is a place where the canvasser or his/her employer is carrying on a business temporarily and, if the canvasser is a club employee, then the exception definitely applies. The airline would not be the creditor just because it brands the card but it might be a supplier if the lure on that occasion is a free flight or loyalty points for the airline. Again, I wonder as well whether the canvasser or his/her employer is carrying on a business at the airport temporarily and, if the canvasser is an airline employee, the exception definitely applies. Attractive though the section 49 point seems, I would be worried about hanging my defence too heavily on it. If this has been covered before (or even done to death before), I am sorry and would be grateful for a pointer in the right direction. Thanks, Peter, for reminding me about section 49 and anything further you have on that will be gratefully received.

... and contact by e-mails is not a good idea either, it strikes me. Posting your e-mail in an open forum is a bad idea and sending your e-mail address to someone you do not know is potentially just as bad an idea.

Looked it up to refresh my memory of those heady times. The automatic strike out in County Court cases was introduced without warning in 1990 and applied where a hearing had not been requested six months after close of pleadings. It was, as I remembered, regarded as a disaster but it took 9 years to bring the experiment to an end when the CPRs came in There was one test appeal in 1997 involving over 100 cases. I don't know where the time limit comes from these days but I suspect it is a local rule.

There was an experiment about 12 or so years with an automatic strike out after 15 or 18 months if it had not been finished by that time. I remember the howls but not the details. The court manager may have a sort of rule of thumb of his own that cases that have been idle for a certain length of time get put before a judge to decide whether to strike out or give further directions.

Premises: what are they and whose are they? Remember that time you went round the local show, fair or exhibition and that nice person offered you a cuddly toy in return for you filling out some details and it turned out you got a free MBNA credit card with every cuddly toy. Was their tent or stand "premises"? (If so, was it MBNA's premises?) And then, remember that other time some nice person came up to you at the football, rugby or shinty match and suggested how much more of a supporter you would be if you took out a credit card from your club (and you didn't even know they had a consumer credit licence). Was the ground MBNA's premises? And that other time as well, you had three minutes left at Luton Airport before you get that cameo role on Airline you've always craved and you do whatever you have to do to get past that man standing between you and the check out desk? Was Luton Airport (or even just the bit of the concourse being patrolled by the canvasser) MBNA's premises? All potentially relevant to the question of cancellation rights, I think. I think that all three could be argued either way but that the first probably tips towards MBNA and the other two against them. Thoughts?

Worse still, I have read in other threads that Northampton have backlogs of up to 4 weeks. So it might be up to a month before you can be sure that they didn't do what needed to be done within the 28 days.

NatWest are owned by RBS, so no point going to them in your situation. Ditto, Lloyds who now own HBOS.

I would argue that persistent breaches of the OFT Debt Collection Guidelines and/or the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations and/or (where it is relevant) the Disability Discrimination Act constitute a course of conduct of sufficient gravity to meet the test set out in Ferguson v BG. On that basis, Ferguson v BG indicates that the claim can be brought against the creditor or the DCA, who are responsible for the acts of their employees and representatives under the principle of corporate liability for harassment.

But Ferguson v British Gas does establish two very important principles that apply equally to DCAs: 1. Although it is necessary to show that the harassment was grave, it is not necessary to prove the claim to the criminal standard. (However, as PT has pointed out, there is another Court of Appeal case from 2007, Conn v Sunderland, that decided that it was necessary to prove a criminal level of harassment.) 2. There can be corporate liability for harassment, not just liability against individuals.

... and PT is better still (which I can safely say on this thread, I hope).

One wrinkle of the offer they have made is the "save as to costs" bit. If you turned down the offer and the amount of costs you got awarded in detailed assessment was less than or around the same as the 2/3 they have offered you, then you would have to pay their costs for the assessment stage - since those would not be at the derisory LIP rate, you could end up owing them money. X20 used to be much more of an expert on costs (and, presumably, still is wherever he or she is now) - I last did anything on costs for real when detailed assessment was still called taxation. However, from what I remember of things X20 said, 2/3 is about the level at which you want to accept an offer. Now, you might well want to make your acceptance conditional on them dropping matters completely, and if you do then I can try and concoct something (but it won't be during today - weather is too nice to waste and I have jobs to do outside, I am instructed). I think that might be what I was being asked to do anyway. I wouldn't mind BRW's opinion on this too. BRW is more practical than I am.

Citizen B, you will have to stop using my name in threads - you will wear it out! I haven't read the whole thread yet, so what am I being asked to do?