I think it relates to the distinction between 'core' term (and therefore not unchallengeable under UTCCR 1994) and a simple contractual term (and therefore challengeable [sic]). The latter obviously requiring a degree of adequacy and fairness. The argument was that once a judgement had been sought on a loan the borrower was likely to be having problems paying it back so any interest charged on the balance owed would make the position even worse and, to make it pertinent, be analogous to a penalty on the borrower for defaulting. Unfortunately this could not be applied to Berwick as the judge had clearly ruled that there was no breach of contract, whereas there was in the cited case. My two cents, I make no warranties as to its accuracy.

So I go into the bank and ask to see my friendly loan advisor. I give him the form and receive his assurances that the c/c issue will all be taken care of. At this point I ask whether there are any other forms I need to sign, i.e. the loan agreement form. He tells me, no, that the permission for a credit check form i signed is sufficient. Suspicious, I ask for a copy, which he tells me he will have to dig out and send to me. I go away wondering whether I'll ever get this form. 2 weeks (ish) pass and i check my c/c account - still in credit - and there's no sign of this form, also, the first payment has come out, complete with LPI premium. So I go into my bank account, less than happy, and speak to a manager. Now this is where I get really mad. The other guy lied to me! The form I signed was only a data access form for the credit check, nothing else. Nothing had been done about my c/c or anything else I had asked for. Anyway, the manager sorts out the c/c issue, does a refund of the LPI premium and promises that she'll address the issue and send me a letter. Oh, yeah, and put an ex-gratia payment of £100.00 into my account and send me a 'gift'. This is all to be confirmed in a letter to me. Sure enough, it happens, the c/c is closed, the money refunded, I get my £100.00 (which I made sure to ensure that it in no way hindered me taking my complaint further) and I get my letter. In my letter it says that I'll receive a new CCA agreement, within a few days, ditto a 'gift'. No mention (to my annoyance) of the lying issue though. Anyway, it's been a week now and no CCA agreement, no gift, no nothing and I'm wondering what my position is re. any T&C regarding the loan and also just how much I can make Lloyds crawl. Any thoughts, suggestions, ideas from those who've managed to make it this far? Elco. P.S. This was originally meant to make for light, diverting, reading so apologies for the verbosity!

... by your favourite High Street Bank, Lloyds TSB. This is half a post for discussion and half something for people to chuckle at Lloyds over. I visited my bank mid to late April to arrange for a regular direct debit to pay off my credit card which I had decided I would stop using, pay off and close. Whilst I was there I was convinced that it would be a more cost effective way to do it to take out a Graduate loan, to which I was entitled, as I could pay that back over the same period of time and at a better rate of interest. This was all hunky dory and I agreed, so I signed my consent for them to carry out a credit search on me. I then had to leave as I had to be elsewhere. I enquired as to whether there was anything else I needed to do but was told that everything was fine and it would all be sorted out. So I took the gentleman at his word and off I went. A couple of days later I receive confirmation that my loan has gone through, and a whole bundle of documents. I read these with growing interest, particularly the sheet entitled 'Personal Loan Checklist', which details a whole lot of information / forms I have apparently seen, had explained to me and signed. Not so. Please note that these include CCA Pre-contract Information and, best of all, the Loan Agreement itself. Furthermore, I notice that I've been signed up to the oh-so-useful LPI which, as I understand it, is not worth the paper it's written on. So off I toddle into my local branch to clear this obvious misunderstanding up. On the way I check the balance of my c/c and find I am now £150 in credit and the account is still open. I shrug my metaphorical shoulders and add that to my list of things to sort. Ok, so I'm now in the bank and being seen by a slightly flustered lady who informs me that she'll have to get the person who arranged the money to look into matters for me and that he will call me. I give her the full details of what I want and what I feel needs rectifying and go back to work. Sure enough I receive a call from the relevant person saying he'll sort out the c/c issue and cancel the LPI (he needs my signature for this so is sending out a form). Sure enough, the form arrives, so I sign it and return it.... (saga continues in the next post so don't post a reply just yet!) ...

Here you go Stax ---------------------------------- Court of Appeal DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING v FIRST NATIONAL BANK PLC (2000) Appeal by the Director General of Fair Trading ('the DG') from the order of Evans-Lombe J refusing the application of the DG for an injunction, pursuant to reg.8(2) Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1994, restraining the defendant ('the Bank') from henceforth entering into or enforcing any loan agreement with a consumer which provided for contractual interest to accrue on any judgment obtained by the Bank under that agreement, or otherwise provided for interest to accrue on interest. The DG alleged that such a provision, which was included in the standard conditions of business on which the Bank provided credit to customers, was unfair within the meaning of the Regulations, which had been made to implement Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in contracts. The Bank was the largest independent grantor of consumer finance and provider of home improvement finance in the UK. The Bank's common form loan agreement provided (by clauses 3 and 8, and Condition 3) that interest at the contractual rate should be payable on the amount of the principal outstanding together with unpaid interest accrued at the date of any judgment obtained by the Bank under the agreement, until the judgment was discharged by payment. The DG was concerned that borrowers who consented to judgment on terms as to payment of the balance then due by instalments over a period of time would find themselves faced with a substantial bill for interest once the balance had been discharged, and sometimes in an amount even larger than the amount of the judgment debt. The DG contended that a simple rate agreement such as that used by the Bank was "unfair" within the meaning of the Regulations, in that "contrary to the requirements of good faith, (it caused) a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations... to the detriment of the consumer. The Bank contended that the interest provision was a "core" term of the loan agreement, within reg.3(2) of the Regulations, in that it concerned the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the... services... supplied", and hence was exempt from the requirement of fairness. Evans-Lombe J held that: (1) the interest provision was not a core term, since the average borrower would not consider default provisions as one of the important terms of the agreement which he would have under consideration when deciding whether or not to accept the offer of advance; but (2) viewed objectively, a simple rate agreement was not inherently unfair, nor was there any substantive or procedural advantage of which consumers were deprived by it, and (in any event) the court retained its powers under ss.129 and 136 Consumer Credit Act 1974 to mitigate any hardship which such an agreement might cause in any particular case. The same two issues arose on the appeal. HELD: (1) The interest provision could not be classified as a "core term", since it did not fall within one or both of paras.(a) and (b) of reg.3(2) of the Regulations, given that it did not define the main subject matter of the contract nor did it concern the adequacy of the remuneration, relating as it did only to the case where a borrower was in default, and then merely providing for the continuation of the contractual interest rate after judgment. (2) The provision was unfair within the meaning of the Regulations to the extent that it enabled the Bank to obtain judgment against a debtor under a regulated agreement and an instalment order without the court having the opportunity to consider whether to invoke its powers under the 1974 Act by, inter alia, reducing the contractual interest rate. The provision created unfair surprise, and so did not satisfy the requirement of good faith. It also caused a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties. Appeal allowed. * The House of Lords granted an application by First National Bank seeking leave to appeal in this case on 29 November 2000. The Appeal Committee had made a provisional unanimous decision to grant leave following a consideration of the applicant's petition and had invited objections from the respondent on 20 November 2000. The appeal was set down for hearing and referred to an Appellate Committee on 5 April 2001. * The House of Lords granted an application by the Director General of Fair Trading seeking leave to cross-appeal to the House of Lords in this case on 19 February 2001. The appeal was set down for hearing and referred to an Appellate Committee on 5 April 2001. Citation: (2000) 2 WLR 1353 ----------------------------------------------------- The matter was then heard in the House of Lords: DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING v FIRST NATIONAL BANK PLC (2001) A simple rate loan agreement was not unfair within the meaning of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 SI 1994/3159. Defendant's ('the Bank') appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal allowing an appeal by the claimant ('DG') from the order of Evans-Lombe J by which he refused an application by the DG for an injunction, pursuant to reg.8(2) Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 SI 1994/3159, restraining the Bank from entering into or enforcing any loan agreement with a consumer which provided for contractual interest to accrue on any judgment obtained by the Bank under that agreement, or otherwise provided for interest to accrue on interest ('the interest provision'). DG contended that a simple rate agreement such as that used by the Bank was "unfair" within the meaning of the Regulations, in that "contrary to the requirements of good faith, (it caused) a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations ... to the detriment of the consumer. The Bank contended that: (i) the interest provision was a "core" term of the loan agreement, within reg.3(2) of the Regulations, in that it concerned "the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the ... services ... supplied, and hence was exempt from the requirement of fairness; and, in the alternative (ii) in any event, the interest provision was not unfair. Evans-Lombe J found for DG on (i) and for the Bank on (ii) and hence dismissed DG's application. On DG's appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the judge's decision on (i) but held that the interest provision was unfair insofar as it enabled the Bank to obtain judgment against a borrower under a regulated agreement and an instalment order without the court having the opportunity to consider whether to invoke its powers under ss.129, 130 and 136 Consumer Credit Act 1974 by, inter alia, reducing the contractual interest rate. The same two issues arose on this appeal. HELD: (1) The interest provision could not be classified as a "core term" of the loan agreement. It did not concern the adequacy of the interest earned by the Bank as its remuneration but was designed solely to ensure that the Bank's entitlement to contractual interest continued after judgment. (2) The provision was not unfair. The essential bargain between the Bank and a borrower, which the borrower would readily understand, was that the borrower would pay all the principal and contractual interest in return for the Bank advancing the loan. The interest provision was simply designed to ensure that that position remained unaffected by the entry of any judgment in favour of the Bank. There was nothing unbalanced or detrimental to the borrower in that result. (3) The undoubted detriment that was nevertheless caused to borrowers by the fact that courts would routinely enter judgments against borrowers without considering whether to invoke ss.129, 130 and 136 of the 1974 Act was a result, not of the unfairness of the interest provision, but of the absence of sufficient procedural safeguards for the borrower at the stage of default, for the simple reason that the 1974 Act did not require the terms of those sections to be drawn to the attention of borrowers. Appeal allowed. Citation: (2001) 3 WLR 1297 -------------------------------------------- Hope this assists.

Hi Elsinore, Yes, they're drastically reducing my overdraft facility and yes, unfortunately, I no longer have access to the money I'd been good and saved! No mention whatsoever was made about reclaiming my account charges was made at the meeting with the account manager. Yes, the account is one and the same The charges total £1,770.00 (excluding, for the moment, overdraft interest charged as the likely applicable amount is not going to be particularly high) Thank you for the speedy reply and I hope you slept well. Elco

Having spent a good couple of hours trawling through the multitude of useful links, advice, forms and bumph on this awesome site I thought I'd take a moment to ask a question that I could not find an answer to. My story fits the general profile of most here i.e. employ the words 'charges', 'astronomical', 'utterly reprehensible' in the appropriate order. However, I also have a further grievance against Lloyds to do with representations made to me in a recent face-to-face meeting with an account manager that I then, foolishly, relied upon. Needless to say, they turned out to be utter rubbish and my reliance on them has put me in a very difficult position financially, one that needs an immediate (and by that I mean within 5 days) solution. Now, the question; do I include both grievances in the same letter and risk the more imperative one getting bogged down in the protracted claim that will almost certainly be a result of my request for the refund of my charges, or should I attempt to deal with them seperately? For the sake of clarity, the urgent problem relates to a scheduled reduction in my overdraft, however, I was told that this would not actually happen so foolishly tied the savings I had kept against this eventuality into something I cannot release them from. Any help, advice, links to pertinent posts would be most appreciated.