I understand your trepidation. Litigation is horrible. However, I encourage you to be bold and to stand up to them. Summon up the strength! There is a time and a place for the softly softly approach, say where the parties are in mediation, but where you're faced with an opponent taking steps to evict you and your family from your home, no way was that ever one of them. You've got to get the gloves off and it is vital that you employ every weapon at your disposal. Remember, these are the people who will happily wipe their feet on you as they change the lock to your front door. Do not allow them to treat you like a doormat. Good luck, X20

Also, can I clarify a few points please. You should NOT withdraw the defence. Assuming the Claimant elects to continue, you should await receipt of notice from the court saying to which court the case has been transferred and then comply with any directions issued as a result of transfer. If the agreement is enforceable which I think it is, ( I will try to get it posted up shortly for confirmation) would you then advise I withdraw, otherwise I could be leaving myself open to massive costs? The test is this: Was the Claimant entitled to the relief sought by the proceedings on the day the Claimant issued the proceedings? The Particulars of Claim will contain a statement of truth to the effect that 'the Claimant is entitled (not 'will be') to (whatever relief is sought by the claim). If it can be shown that at the date of the commencement of the proceedings the Claimant was not entitled because the right to enforce the agreement had not then crystallised (eg a failure to comply with CCA 1974 s77), the Defence will have succeeded. That the claim has or may have become enforceable post-issue is irelevant in determining whether there was an enforceable agreement in existence at the time the proceedings were issued. If your defence succeeds the likelihood of the claimant recovering costs is extremely remote. If you withdraw your defence you lose the chance to argue the point I just mentioned and expose yourself to the likelihood of judgment being entered against you for the amount of the claim and costs. Of course all this turns on the question whether there had been compliance with your s77 request and earlier you were saying how confident you were that there had not been compliance by when the proceedings were issued. If you are not so confident, please say what your reservations are.** I have read the extract from the letter you received. I had rather assumed, since you juxtaposed CPR PD 7C and CPR 16 with an invitation to withdraw the defence, that the solicitor had been saying you should withdraw the defence becausee CPR 16 did not apply. That doesn't seem to be the case. So what was the reason given for suggesting you should withdraw your Defence? **Before posting I saw your comment that delivery of the s77 request was to an agent of the Claimant. the question is thus: 'is delivery to an agent tantamount to delivery to the Claimant?' In my opinion a court will be slow to regard delivery of an applicant's s77 request as invalidly served where it is delivered to an agent who has his principal's authority to deal with the applicant concerning matters relating to the subject agreement and who give's notice to the applicant that dealings are to be with the agent at the agent's address. I say this on the basis that an agent has implied authority to do whatever is ordinarily or necessarily incidental to his express authority. In my opinion that includes dealing with a request under s77. It may not extend to answering the request, but dealing may fairly be construed as for example, simply forwarding the request on to the Claimant. I would not expect the court to treat the s77 request as something the agent might pretend he had never received and indeed the agent appears to have proceeded to address one of your two s77 requests, plainly showing therefore that his express authority extended to dealing with a s77 request. The solicitor now conducting the case for the Claimant is himself an agent of the Claimant and no one would seriously suggest that submitting a request to the solicitor in relation to the claim ought only to have been delivered to the Claimant. I see no relevant distinction between the two kinds of agents on the matter of the delivery of a s77 request. One thing I'm not clear on is the matter of the stay. I had surmised the stay had been invoked owing to a failure on the part of the Claimant to give notice under 5.2, but since you say there has been a transfer, perhaps the stay was made for different reasons. Where is the case now proceeding and what was the reason stated by the court for directing there should be a stay?

Yes, they would be required to establish that the person seeking disclosure of the information was a person entitled to receive it, which requirement would not be satisfied simply by your partner ringing them up saying he was doing so on your behalf. In any case, the reality of the situation is most likely that dealing with them on the phone is not going get you a result whether you make the call or your partner does. The only steps I would recommend are first write to whoever issued the SD setting out full particulars of the grounds upon which you dispute the debt and invite them to confirm withdrawal of the SD. You should insist on receiving a reply by a date being not later than 10 days after serivce of the SD upon you. If they confirm withdrawal job done. If they do not reply by the time stated your next step will be to apply to your local county court for an order that the SD be set aside. You must make the application to the court within 18 days of being served with the SD. In the absence of written withdrawal, a failure to apply to set aside the SD will expose you to a risk that a bankruptcy petition will be presented against you. What are the grounds of defence? X20

Just noticed you said the case has already been stayed. That would tie in with what I was saying about the procedure under PD 7C 5.2. In other words, the Claimant has not notified the court that it wishes to continue with the claim. That the Claimant does not wish to continue with the claim in the face of your defence that there has been a failure to comply with your CCA 74 (s77?) request for a copy of the agreement made many months ago, makes sense. A failure to comply prohibits the lender from enforcing the agreement. It would seem you will be able to prove there was a failure to comply with your request before the proceedings began and therefore the commencement of proceedings against you was prohibited. There wouldn't be much point in the Claimant carrying on with a case it had no right to bring. That then begs the question whether in light of the recent production of the document, the Claimant might begin fresh proceedings. If the Claimant should bring fresh proceedings for the same relief sought and the same or similar set of facts disclosed in the proceedings now subject to a stay, you would be entitled to apply to the court to stay the second proceedings until the first proceedings were disposed of. Since the Claimant will be unwilling to continue with the first set of proceedings, the disposal of those proceedings will invoive the Claimant in discontinuing those proceedings. Costs consequences arise where proceedings are discontinued. That won't be the end of it either. CPR 38.7 says: A claimant who discontinues a claim needs the permission of the court to make another claim against the same defendant if- (a) he discontinued the claim after the defendant filed a defence; and (b) the other claim arises out of facts which are the same or substantially the same as those relating to the discontinued claim. The commentary notes to CPR 38.7 say: If following discontinuance fresh proceedings are commenced either with or without permission of the court the discontinuance is not of itself a defence to the fresh claim. It is suggested that the permission to commence fresh proceedings will not be easily given since in any event the new claim could be struck out as an abuse of the court’s process under CPR 3.4 (see para CPR 3.4). The court is likely to attach conditions to any permission given under this Rule such as an initial requirement that the costs for which the applicant is liable upon the discontinued proceedings are paid beforehand and that the claimant otherwise makes a payment into court. In those circumstances 'write off' seems just about all the Claimant might now care to do. X20

I've never heard such nonsense. CPR Part 16 deals with statements of case (of which a defence is a type), with CPR 16.5 setting out provisions governing what should be contained within a defence. Even if the Claimant issued out of a production centre (most likely Northampton), the provisions of CPR 16 still apply. CPR PD 7C which deals with cases issued out of a production centre directs the centre to handle defences [CPR PD 7C 1.3(2)(a)] and at 5.2 sets out the procedure to be adopted where a Defendant files a defence. Under 5.2 once a defence is filed the Claimant is asked to state whether he wishes the claim to continue. He has 28 days to answer. If he fails to answer the claim is stayed. If he answers saying he wishes to continue, the claim is transferred to the county court having jurisdiction where you reside. You should NOT withdraw the defence. Assuming the Claimant elects to continue, you should await receipt of notice from the court saying to which court the case has been transferred and then comply with any directions issued as a result of transfer. X20

I note you say the order for production of the agreement was made at your request. On what basis did you frame your request? I assume that it was not because you had previously made an application for production of it under CCA 1974 s77, because if you had made an application for it, I presume there had not been full compliance with s77 (for else there would be little need to ask the court to direct that it be disclosed) and consequently the bank would not have been entitled to bring any proceedings to enforce the agreement owing to the provisions of s77(4)(a). If I am right (ie no previous s77 application), then on this basis we need only look at the provisions of the order and whether there has been compliance with it, not whether there has been compliance with s77. You state that the order of the court directed the bank to provide 'a copy of the original signed agreement'. This order is probably therefore an order for disclosure made under CPR Part 31, most likely CPR 31.14 which deals with the disclosure of documents referred to in statements of case. The bank would not appear to have complied strictly with the letter of the order. They haven't produced a copy of the original agreement. Indeed, I don't know whether they produced any document at all. They say they don't have the original loan agreement and seek to excuse their failure to produce it by a convoluted process of pleading compliance with s77. A litigant can not be compelled to produce a document which is not in his possession or custody. Neither can a litigant be compelled to disclose a document where it lacks the power to require release of that document into its possesion or control in order to disclose it. To comply with his disclosure obligations under CPR Part 34, a litigant has a duty to [1] carry out a reasonable and proportionate search for relevant documents and [2] disclose those documents which are or have been in his control. I would give consideration to interogating the bank to establish what steps were taken to carry out a reasonable and proportionate search for the document. If a reasonable and proportionate search was not carried out the bank fell short of its obligation and can not be excused for failing to comply with the order. In that event you could apply to the court for a further order, perhaps with a sanction if the bank should persist in failing to comply with the order and its disclosure obligations. If the bank did carry out a reasonable and proportionate search but still failed to locate the document, the bank will have met its disclosure obligations so long as the bank then makes a statement verifying (to the deponent's information and belief) what became of the lost document. If the bank intends to prosecute a claim against you under an agreement which it is unable to produce in evidence, to succeed the bank will have to prove the making of the agreement and compliance with any aspects governing the execution of the agreement which you have put in issue, by some other way. Their only prospect would be by witness evidence, either by witness summons directing some other person who has the original signed loan agreement to attend and bring the agreement in to court, or by witnesses who attest to the contents of the agreement and it being signed by you. Frankly I think the bank's prospects in such circumstances woud be very weak and I would not expect s77 to assist them. Compliance with s77 requires at the very least production of a 'true copy' which may not necessarily include a signature and so on, How can the bank begin to issue what they deem to be a 'true copy' in compliance with s77 where they are unable to compare it with the original signed agreement? If they don't have the original the bank cannot say that the document they provide under s77 is a true copy of it. If they can't verify it as a true copy, they can't comply with s 77 and if they can't comply with s77 then, under s77(4)(a), they can't enforce the agreement. X20

An IOU is an acknowledgement of indebtedness, freely signed or initialled in the hand of the party liable. You might want to tell us how the liability arises as defined by the IOU or better still, just scan in or produce the text of the IOU so as to be able to assess whether the document demonstrates an actionable liability on its face or not. You might also want to spell out the actions constituting the duress or undue influence in order to test whether or not there are good grounds to suppose any signature was not freely given. This is her flat from which her sister and b-in-law had moments earlier collected a dog. They produce this bit of paper and tell her sign it or else you don't get back in the flat. There's more to it surely?

How about this? To: the solicitors Their reference: Dear Sir, Re: Kensington v (Your name) I was alarmed to receive a notice from (name) County Court that you have caused the issue of a warrant for possession of my home and that I am to be evicted on 2 September 2008. As my account records will demonstrate, each payment which has fallen due since the order made in April has been made in full, albeit two to three weeks later than directed. The delay in payment arises because Mr (your husband) receives his salary on the 15th day of each calendar month. As such, the payments due 30 April, 31 May, 30 June have all been paid and the instalment due 31 July will be paid in this way in a few days time. I am astonished in light of my payment history, that your client issued instructions to take the drastic step of evicting me. In the circumstances I am inviting you to confirm to me and to give notice to the court that you have withdrawn the warrant. I will expect you to have notified me in writing that you have done this by not later than (say 26 August 2008). You should take notice that if I have not received confirmation by (date as above) I will immediately make application to the court for an order that the warrant be suspended by which I will invite the court to exercise its powers under Administration of Justice Act 1970 section 36. I have every confidence the court will find that my payment record to date demonstrates an ability to meet the monthly instalments within a reasonable time and that weighing up the serious disadvantages which would flow from being made homeless and the resulting burden which would be placed on my hard pressed local housing authority, against the disadvantage to your client of receiving payment a little later in the month, that justice favours suspending or discharging the warrant you issued. ** If I am compelled to make such an application and the result is as I expect, I will also invite the court to direct your client to pay the costs associated with my application by [1] reimbursing my court fee and [2] disallowing the costs of the application for the warrant and of your attendance at the hearing of my application to be added to my mortgage account, and in doing so will produce a copy of this letter to assist the court in reaching a decision. I look forward to hearing from you as quickly as possible. yours faithfully One other thought: If you have children aged under 18 years living with you, say so where I have asterisked in the body of the letter. Identify them as schoolboy/schoolgirl etc and by their age(s) only. In addition to the above the court will take into account the welfare of children, particularly so if, as would be likely in early September, they will be commencing a new academic year at school. I'll leave you to fill in the blanks and put the letter in the postbox. Hope this covers your requirements X20

In all likelihood the shopkeeper wouldn't know for sure whether he was selling you a satisfactory component or not. But that's no excuse. If you buy something new from a shop, statute implies into the contract for the purchase that the goods will be fit for purpose, durable and so on. A failure to supply goods which comply with these implied terms is a breach of contract. Shopkeepers who breach contracts are liable for loss. If shopkeepers could raise the 'I had no idea' defence consumers would be left without a remedy. A manufacturer may very well be ultimately responsible for the manufacture of defective goods, but as the ultimate consumer in this scenario I would not advise bypassing the shopkeeper. Your contract was with the shopkeeper not the manufacturer. The manufacturer may in contractual terms be some distance removed from the shopkeeper. The shopkeeper may have got the shower unit from a distributor, who got it from the importer, who got it from the manufacturer. Do you see? If the shopkeeper has sold you a dud, let him pursue his remedy against whoever he bought the dud off. Proceeding directly against the manufacturer would very likely open an unholy can of worms, especially if the manufacturer is based overseas, worse, outside the EU. Always best to keep things simple. That way you don't have to deal with things like the manufacturer will not be held responsible for any damage caused, because the manufacturers terms and conditions are not terms of your contract with the shopkeeper.

I assume this is a mortgage possession claim which resulted in the making of a possession order against you, the enforcement of which was suspended on terms providing for you to make payment of [1] the monthly mortgage repayments and [2] so much a month off the arrears. Evidently, Kensington have issued a warrant for possesion of your home. In making an application for the issue of the warrant Kensington will have certified that at the date of the making of the application you were in breach of the suspension terms and that the whole or part of an instalment remained owing. The court officer presented with the application does not interogate the applicant for the warrant. They treat the certifiate as truthful. From what I can tell, your breach is a minor breach and I am also surpirsed that Shelter were so dismissive. In effect and as I understand things, Kensington are collecting what is owing under the suspension order, but they are receiving payment later than the day on which the payments fall due. I take it when you say they receive it 'late each month' they are receving payment a few days or weeks later; not months later. So in reality when they applied for the warrant there may have been some money owing, but that money was conceivably paid perhaps as little as a few days later. It would be worthwhile for you to check whether on the day the application was made there was in truth the whole or part of an instalment owing. Let's though assume the warrant was properly requested. You have the power to and MUST apply to the court for the warrant to be suspended. The court has power to suspend a warraant under Administration of Justice Act 1970 s36. Section 36 says: (1) Where the mortgagee under a mortgage of land which consists of or includes a dwelling-house brings an action in which he claims possession of the mortgaged property, not being an action for foreclosure in which a claim for possession of the mortgaged property is also made, the court may exercise any of the powers conferred on it by subsection (2) below if it appears to the court that in the event of its exercising the power the mortgagor is likely to be able within a reasonable period to pay any sums due under the mortgage or to remedy a default consisting of a breach of any other obligation arising under or by virtue of the mortgage. (2) The court— (a)may adjourn the proceedings, or (b)on giving judgment, or making an order, for delivery of possession of the mortgaged property, or at any time before the execution of such judgment or order, may— (i) stay or suspend execution of the judgment or order, or (ii) postpone the date for delivery of possession, for such period or periods as the court thinks reasonable. (3) Any such adjournment, stay, suspension or postponement as is referred to in subsection (2) above may be made subject to such conditions with regard to payment by the mortgagor of any sum secured by the mortgage or the remedying of any default as the court thinks fit. (4) The court may from time to time vary or revoke any condition imposed by virtue of this section. You will see that the court's powers to suspend under s36 apply where 'the mortgagor is likely to be able within a reasonable period to pay any sums due under the mortgage..' You haven't told us anything about the equity available in your home, but that may not matter so much. In my opinion, a District Judge will happily find that a mortgagor who is regularly each month paying the sums due under a suspension order albeit late, is a person who is 'able to pay within a reasonable time'. The District Judge will almost certainly weigh up the disadvantages to you and your familiy of being dispossessed of your home and the burden placed on your local housing authority to find you emergency accommodation were you made homeless if the warrant was allowed to proceed, against the disadvantage to Kensington of not being paid on the nail. District Judges are, I understand, as a matter of policy, directed to 'wear a social hat' in situations of this kind. In my view, assuming I have corectly understood the situation, a DJ with his hat on and applying section 36 will have no hesitation in suspending the warant. For these reasons, again assuming I have correctly understood the situation, I would be inclined to write to Kensington's lawyers setting out the true account situation, the powers of the court under section 36 and the disadvantages and hardship which would follow enforcement. I would also invite them to agree to withdraw the warrant, adding that should they decline to consent and ultimately the court should allow your application to suspend, that you will ask the court to direct [1] Kensington pay your application fee and [2] the disallowance of their costs associated with the issue of the warrant and the hearing (which they would otherwise just add on to your mortgage account under the costs indemnity powers which almost certainly apply to your mortgage). You should get this letter off ASAP because you will want to get your application to suspend into court in good time prior to the date fixed for the eviction. If I have misunderstood you'd better correct me. Otherwise, good luck.

A bankruptcy petition may be presented to the court in excess of 4 months following the service of a statutory demand (SD). In presenting the petition the creditor is obliged to explain the reason for the delay in his affidavit verifying the petition [insolvency Rules 1986 6.12(7)] You won't be served with the affidavit verifying the petition so you won't know whether there has been compliance with 6.12(7). Ask the petitioner to supply a copy or ring up the court and ask them. If there has not been compliance ask the court to dismiss the petition for non-compliance. If there has been compliance you will need to be prepared to argue that the delay is unjustifiable or has caused you prejudice, for example, in reliance upon the fact that a petition had not been served within 4 months of service of the SD, you aplied available sums to the discharge of other debts, thereby prejudicing your position with the creditor. Alternatively, you extended your credit arrangements in a way which you would not have done had the petition been presented without undue delay. Clearly, any prejudice would need to be prejudice arising after the 4 months expired. Relying solely on late presentation of the petition as a ground for its dismissal is a little weak. Ideally you will have better grounds. If the petition is based on a SD for non payment of a judgment debt, you are likely to be in difficulty unless you can discharge the debt before the making of a bankrupcy order or find some other technical argument. Alternatively, if the judgment is a default judgment (ie a judgment made other wise than on the merits of the case), you may want to consider applying to the court to set aside the judgment. If the petition is based on a SD but not on a judgment and you are able to show an arguable defence to the money claim, you must promote that argument. You will need to advance your argument in an affidavit and deliver it to the court. If you don't advance an argument in defence and there are no technical arguments to fall back on, the creditor's affidavit verifying that you owe the debt will be taken on face value and the likely upshot in that event will be that a bankruptcy order is made against you.

Always a tricky one this, that is where you bought the goods and had them installed by a third party. If the goods you bought from the shop were defective at the time of purchase or can be presumed to be so (ie unfit for intended purpose or damaged etc) and the fault(s) caused the escape of water, the shop where you bought them from would be held liable for the consequential loss you sustained. If the goods were of satisfactory quality there ought not to have been a leak unless the third party, the person who carried out the installation work, carried out that work without sufficient skill and care, in which case the third party will be responsible for the consequential loss. The trouble will be in establishing where fault lies. Some independent examination will be necessary involving at the first instance, neither the shop nor the plumber who carried out the installation because it is likely each will blame the other. There's always the risk of a third cause, namely that you yourself or members of your houselhold caused the damage through abuse or misuse of the installation. I've no idea obviously whether there would be any basis in such an accusation but if it could be shown that the most likely explanation for the failure of the installation was misuse you would probably have great difficulty in establishing the loss suffered arose owing to breach on the part of either the shopkeeper or the installer. An independent examination will probably involve you in some expense for the production of a report. You might therefore find it worthwhile to report the incident to your buildings insurers who in turn may commission a report to investigate seeing how the installation was carried out not that long ago. That way the insurers pick up the tab for the report and you get to find out what caused the leak, defective goods, defective installation or misuse. If the insurers take the view that responsibility for the loss can be passed on to the shopkeeper or the installer they may decide to make a claim for their outlay on the person responsible (who in turn will most likely pass the claim over to their insurers). If this should happen, you should ask your insurers to include a claim for any uninsured loss you suffered, like for example, the insurance excess. Likewise, if the insurers decide not to make a claim, armed with the benefit of the report, you might wish to bring a claim for your uninsured losses, though, because your uninsured loss might be so trivial weighed against the pain in the neck that making a small claim (less than £5,000.00) involves, you might not want to take the matter any further than writing a few snotty letters to the person responsible or their insurers.

Noomill060 suggested I post this thread to this particular forum where I should get more information. Here goes. This is what I asked: This is my first post to the forum and hope someone will be able to help. I took a car on HP through General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) and in early 2007 I missed a couple of payments. They sent out a default notice intending the same to satisfy CCA 1974 s87. I failed to comply with the notice so they terminated and have recently begun proceedings in the County Court for return of the car, accelerated payments, costs, interst, the lot. I am defending the claim and have argued the default notice does not meet the requirements of s88 because the date specfied in the notice for compliance PRE-DATES the date on which the notice was issued by 14 days! I say the notice is ineffective therefore, that none of the rights under s87 are or were ever exercisable by GMAC and all of the consequences of Woodchester v Swayne fall into place, ie no power to recover the car or claim eary repayment and all they are entitled to are the arrears specified in the (ineffective) notice. The solicitors representing GMAC have made offers to settle. From a claim in which they want £13,000.00 plus the car, they are now willing to accept the car and just a £500.00 contribution towards depreciation. They say they do not want their legal costs paying. To encourage me to settle they suggest that if the default notice is ineffective (which it plainly is) then GMAC had no right to terminate under s87 (which I agree with). They then go on to say that therefore they can serve a second default notice. I have my doubts about the ability to serve a second default notice. I say once they terminated, albeit contrary to the provisions of s87, they elected to terminate unlawfully. Essentially it seems to me the courts will be slow to allow a hirer who issued a defective default notice and terminated in breach of s87, to recover its position. Termination is termination and 'two wrongs don't make a right.' Besides, how can GMAC issue me with a default notice in relation to a contract which they told me they treated as terminated. I have tried without success to see if there have been any cases in this area but without success. Anybody got any views? Thanks to all in advance.

Thanks noomill. I;ll post to that forum as well then. What are my objectives? Well, as you can imagine, GMAC have been trying to make my life as miserable as possible, so my objective is to turn the tables on them. It seemed to me that if the failure to serve a valid default notice operates to prevent them from recovering the car and accelerated payments and that this is the objective of them taking me to court, I could either [1] invite the court to strike out the claim against me under the court's case managment powers (CPR Part 3) or [2] apply for summary judgment on the grounds that GMAC have no real prospect of succeeding in the claim (CPR Part 24). I have already invited the court in my Allocation Questionnaire to strike out under CPR Part 3, and I'll have to see how the court plays that one. Nonetheless, the negotiations continue and for my part I offered to return the car to GMAC in return for £2,000.00! I realise that might seem a little cheeky but if they have no power to recover the car or seek any money beyond the arrears set out in the default notice, they're dead in the water. So it seemed to me that paying me £2,000.00 for the privilege of having back a car worth nearly four times that sum and also overcoming their arrogance and flouting of Consumer Credit legislation might make commercial sense to them. This is where their solicitors come back at me saying they can serve a new default notice AFTER termination so as to be able to undo all their wrongs. They say they can serve a new default notice requiring payment of all the 'arrears' down to the date of the new default notice, which would be a pretty hefty sum (about £9K I reckon), which if I didn't pay within the customary 14 days would lead to them terminating (again) demanding the arrears plus accelerated payments and the car. This all seems too easy for a hirer in breach of the legislation, hence I wondered if case law or anything else supported their solicitors' arguments.

This is my first post to the forum and hope someone will be able to help. I took a car on HP through General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) and in early 2007 I missed a couple of payments. They sent out a default notice intending the same to satisfy CCA 1974 s87. I failed to comply with the notice so they terminated and have recently begun proceedings in the County Court for return of the car, accelerated payments, costs, interst, the lot. I am defending the claim and have argued the default notice does not meet the requirements of s88 because the date specfied in the notice for compliance PRE-DATES the date on which the notice was issued by 14 days! I say the notice is ineffective therefore, that none of the rights under s87 are or were ever exercisable by GMAC and all of the consequences of Woodchester v Swayne fall into place, ie no power to recover the car or claim eary repayment and all they are entitled to are the arrears specified in the (ineffective) notice. The solicitors representing GMAC have made offers to settle. From a claim in which they want £13,000.00 plus the car, they are now willing to accept the car and just a £500.00 contribution towards depreciation. They say they do not want their legal costs paying. To encourage me to settle they suggest that if the default notice is ineffective (which it plainly is) then GMAC had no right to terminate under s87 (which I agree with). They then go on to say that therefore they can serve a second default notice. I have my doubts about the ability to serve a second default notice. I say once they terminated, albeit contrary to the provisions of s87, they elected to terminate unlawfully. Essentially it seems to me the courts will be slow to allow a hirer who issued a defective default notice and terminated in breach of s87, to recover its position. Termination is termination and 'two wrongs don't make a right.' Besides, how can GMAC issue me with a default notice in relation to a contract which they told me they treated as terminated. I have tried without success to see if there have been any cases in this area but without success. Anybody got any views? Thanks to all in advance.