Hopefully!! Fingers crossed for when the OP returns UF

DebT, just worth noting that if there is a six year gap at any point in the history of the debt, then making payments two years ago would NOT have reset the clock; once a debt is statute barred, it cannot become un-statute barred. Cheers UF

Hi, please try not to panic. Can you please let us know if there has ever been a gap of 6 years where there was no payment or written acknowledgement for this debt? Cheers UF

OK, well unfortunately my understanding is that with agreements alleged to be as old as this one, they only need to supply what they have done.... so long as the reason for the original not being available is one that is outside of the OC's control..... What I'm not sure about, however, is what exactly the status quo would be if (fairly big if, I might add!) they took you to court for this matter...... hopefully someone with this knowledge will pop in shortly to clarify this point. I've never personally had anything to do with an agreement as old as this one.... but I'll do some digging and see if I can find anything that might be able to help you in any way.... in the meantime if any other member pops in and has this info off the top of their head, then fabulous.... Cheers UF

Ok, what they are referring to is the following: _________________________ Consumer Credit (Cancellation Notices and Copies of Documents) Regulations 1983/1557 This version in force from: May 19, 1985 to present (version 1 of 1) 9. Copies of old agreements and security instruments where the agreement or security instrument has been lost etc. Any copy of an executed agreement made before 19th May 1985 or of a security instrument relating to security provided before that date which is given to the debtor, hirer or surety under any provision of the Act on or after that date may comprise an easily legible statement of the current terms of the agreement or security as the case may be insofar as they are known to the creditor or owner where, due to an accident or some other cause beyond his control, the creditor or owner does not have in his possession the executed agreement or security instrument or any copy thereof. _________________________ Have they sent you any the items detailed above? Cheers UF

cab: The legislation that you have attached in a .pdf document is not UK Legislation, it is an Act in force in New Zealand, from what I can see. I can't find such an Act listed in any statute database active for the UK. Cheers UF

They are absolutely required to pass on your request - as the letter states; if they are simply acting as an agent collecting they debt then they are required to pass on your request, if they are acting as a purchaser of the benefit under common law equitable assignment then the same rule applies and, finally, if they have bought the debt under an absolute assignment then they have purchased the rights as well as the obligations - as the letter points out. This is a common ploy adopted by DCA's which is, in my opinion, nothing short of an in-vain attempt to frustrate proceedings, confuse the alleged debtor, and circumnavigate the rule of law!! I would send the in dispute letter; in my opinion, if you have proof that your request was delivered and the letter returning your postal order then they have voluntarily returned this and the statutory time limit for them to comply with your request began on the day that your request was delivered!!! All the best and keep us posted. Cheers UF.

Also, congrats Huggy on getting them to admit it's stat barred

Without a shadow of a doubt, whatsoever, that would be statute barred based on those dates!! On those facts it definitely appears clear that the date from which the statute barred clock would have started ticking is the payment made in March 2004 - so long as no written acknowledgement of the debt has been made since then? Can you please confirm that this is the case? In which case - definitely fire off the statute barred template and tell them to Foxtrot Oscar Cheers UF

Could always sell that debt on to a Debt Collection Agency

Exactly, I love how they try and brutalise case judgments to meet their own desires by picking the bits they like and forgetting to mention the rest and, in my own personal opinion, in an attempt to harass and bully money from people by deceit. With every day that passes, I think my loathing of these companies increases..... As said above, send the account in dispute letter, and keep us posted on any developments. All the best UF

Absolutely I'm in agreement with that. And Diddy, I meant no offence... apparently I've been really rather grumpy given a recent bout of chronic insomnia.... hence the 5am posts. I think that in the majority of cases, the date concerned would indeed be that of the last payment or acknowledgement. The part that we are not in agreement with is the scenario in which that may not be the case. In my opinion, in the example of your last post, the cause of action as per S5 Limitation Act would occur at the date on which your first payment was due and not paid and so, again in my opinion, this would be the initial date from which the limitation clock would tick. If then a further payment or acknowledgement was made, then this would obviously have the effect of resetting the clock. Their Lordships in Wilkinson were quite specific when it was stated, as per one of my earlier quotes, that the right of action accrued at the instance where the defendant defaulted on a payment; as in missed the payment, not as in the company issued a default notice as has previously been the misunderstanding. On that basis I personally feel it is important to inform people that each case will turn on its own facts and that, although a good rule of thumb in most instances, it is not accurate to say that it is always the last payment or acknowledgement that is the date from which time begins. Section 5 clearly states that the clock begins from the date on which the cause of action accrued; and I am still at a loss as to how making a payment on time could be considered a cause of action...? As for your example, I would consider that again, if there was a specific date arranged on which you were to pay, then the time would begin ticking on the first instance that you missed a payment and this would remain the date for the limitation period to run from so long as you made no further payments or acknowledgements. But straftat, yes indeed the case law is fairly clear, I believe, that so long as the proceedings are commenced within the statutory time limit, the debt will not be considered statute barred for the purposes of those proceedings. Cheers UF

DiddyDicky, you are quite clearly wrong on a number of points. Firstly, you say: Please note the following: Also, your opinion of the theoretical scenario is not in keeping with the precedent judgment that we have been discussing (Wilkinson) in relation to these matters. Have you read that judgment in it's entirety? The Judges in that are quite clear that the time limit runs from the time when the right to receive the funds accrues / the cause of action occurs. Each case will turn on its own facts as to when this happens; depending not least upon the terms of the agreement. If you contend that I am wrong, as you clearly do, perhaps you would be good enough to substantiate your views as expressed by your theoretical scenario with authoritative case law etc? As it is easy for us to say the law is this, that and the other; but without case law to justify such opinions, the words are worthless. None of us even suggested that any acknowledgement or payment after 6 years could restart the clock, this clearly cannot be done: Finally, if court action is started within that 6 year period, then the debt will not be statute barred; again look at the full judgment in Wilkinson to see that they talk only of whether the proceedings had be started in time; not concluded in time. UF

I have heard, on VERY rare occasions, of debt being written off owing to compassionate grounds; such as illness etc. Although, as I say, I've only personally heard of such action about 3 times!

Also, you are STILL taking the assumption that the defendant defaulting on the account and the claimant issuing a default are the same thing - they are not!! When their Lordships spoke of the defendant defaulting, they were talking of them missing payments. The defendant defaulting on payments and the creditor issuing a default are two entirely different things!! The date on which the defendant defaulted on a payment is easily ascertained as the dates would be a part of any contract and so it is a provable fact. The claimant withholding issuing a default has absolutely no bearing on matters and would not, in any way shape or form, extend the limitation period. This is clear from the wording of the Wilkinson judgment; the time runs from when the right to receive the moneys accrued which they clearly identified as being when the defendant missed payments. UF

Furthermore could you explain exactly how a Judgment could be obtained in the situation that the claimant is unable to substantiate any claim with relevant paperwork? If that paperwork does not exist, then the claimant would fail at the first hurdle in court, so long as the defendant argued their case. Assuming that the claimant did have the relevant paperwork to be successful, then the defendant would be entitled to a copy of all of this before any court hearing, under the Civil Procedure Rules, in order to form their defence effectively. Cheers UF

JonCris, I've found the source of your posts, which are copied pretty much word for word. I've emailed the editor of that source, who is on the face of it a very well educated person. For all intents and purposes, he appears to agree with me: The above is the response I've received. Fact is that the assumption that in practice the date always is that of the last payment is irreconcilable with the Judgment that is the active precedent. It is a matter of fact based on a case by case basis, which is what I've been trying to get across. Cheers UF

For the purposes of open debate on this topic, that clearly is very important to a great many of us, and anyone who is reading this thread with intrigue, the debate is also being had in another thread in a slightly different section of the CAG: http://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/general-debt-issues/269060-time-barred-when.html Cheers UF

I agree BankFodder and I rely, also, upon the Judgment of Wilkinson: We've been having this debate in another thread also, if you were interested in that: http://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/debt-collection-industry/268907-when-debt-statute-barred-2.html#post3048134 As far as my understanding goes from the wording of the Limitation Act and the relevant precedent cases, it goes as follows: --> Initial cause of action (missing a payment) begins the clock ticking. --> If no further payments or acknowledgements are made, then the above would be the relevant date for the purposes of the Limitation Act. --> If further payment or acknowledgement is made after the initial cause of action occurred, then the date of this payment and/or acknowledgement would now constitute the relevant date for the purposes of the Limitation Act. Cheers UF

Straftat, that's the situation as I understand it also. Cheers UF

JonCris, have you actually read the Wilkinson Judgment as reported? Please allow me to quote Lord Scott of Foscote at para 29: I note that the reference to the one month after the couple defaulted on payments is not a general rule, but rather a part of the clause of the charge on property brought about as part of the mortgage concerned. Further I point out again that there is a difference between the couple defaulting on their payments, and a default notice being issued. I'm really quite intrigued as to where you gathered your perception that their Lordships had deemed the time limit to run from the date of the last payment? I've read this Judgment many times previously and at no point do their Lordships make any such statement. Cheers UF

Also please read the piece of my post #8 that you have quoted again, and note the entire line, namely "if any acknowledment or payment is received after this date ...... " As in, after the date of the initial cause of action.

JonCris, I'm sorry but can I respectfully point out that you are reading parts of my posts in isolation and not in the posts entirety. You're assumption that it is always from the last payment or written acknowledgement is wrong, and is not substantiated in the text of the Limitation Act. I note also that you have still failed to point me in the direction of any part of the Act that agrees with you that it is the last payment always. Please do point me in that direction. If you can then I shall gladly admit that I am mistaken. Please look at the part of my post that you have quoted - it is regarding S29 - i.e. what can RESET the clock and NOT what can be considered as the initial cause of action. Just to simplify this: When we say that a debt is Statute Barred, this is by virtue of section 5 Limitation Act 1980. This section is clear that it is the cause of action that the date begins from. Now if we fast-forward to section 29, this deals with situations that can be considered to effectively reset the date of this cause of action. For a debt to be Stat Barred, 6 years from the legal cause of action has to have elapsed. This, as far as the Act is concerned, is either from the initial cause of action or, more often, from the date of a payment or acknowledgement that (by virtue of S29) are considered to be the new date of the cause of action. If a payment is missed and no further payments or acknowledgements are made, can you explain how the previous payment that was actually made can be considered a cause of action? You keep talking about defaults etc and I can only assume that you are talking about defaults being issued on an account. The date that a Default Notice was issued on the account has no bearing on the status of a debt as far as S5 is concerned. A default notice being issued is not a cause of action insomuch as it is not a breach of contract giving rise to the right to litigate and, therefore, cannot be considered to reset the clock. Hopefully this clarifies the point raised by Harrassed Senior as well. I know many DCA's try this ruse, but it is utterly false. Cheers UF

Also as always I agree entirely with fuzzybobble's post!! Also I entirely agree that they should be able to get themselves in order within 6 years, but it's still important to ascertain exactly when this 6 years could be deemed to run from.

I'm simply playing devil's advocate here so please don't shoot me down, I post what I understand to be the most accurate information I can. At the end of the day if, like you say, we know that we're up against a Judicial lottery, then why on earth would we choose to ignore any of these pieces of information. Could you please point me towards the section of the Act that says that it runs from the date of the last payment? S5 refers only to the cause of action; which is when you breach the contract by failing to make the payment. How can the payment that you made the previous month be considered as a cause of action? S29 refers simply to what can be considered to reset the clock once the initial cause of action has occurred. Take for example the following: Date A --> Open credit account / take out loan etc Date B --> Fail to make payment --> This is the initial cause of action. * If no further payment or acknowledgement was made, then this could be seen as the starting point of the 6 years pursuant to S5. Date C --> Part-payment or acknowledgement made --> S29 considers this to reset the clock and thus this would make date C the date from which the 6 years runs. Cheers UF